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Abstract 
This paper examines small states holding the role of the European Union Council 
Presidency , a six-month rotating position and an opportunity for member states to guide 
policy-making in the European Union. The position is advantageous to the holder 
because the Presidency can levy influence over policy-making through introducing 
proposals for policy debates and advancing priorities in the Council. Each state creates a 
program of priorities in preparation for holding the Presidency, and this paper studies 
the advancement of priorities for three cases: Slovenia (first half2008), the Czech 
Republic (first half 2009) and Sweden (second half 2009). The author carried out an 
assessment and evaluation of Slovenia and Sweden's five priorities and the three of the 
Czech Republic. The results were then compared to five other factors- how soon the 
next elections were, the domestic level of EU support , whether the state had prior 
Presidency experience , how many euros the state budgeted for the Presidency, and an 
average related to decision outcomes based on the Decision-Making in the European 
Union II dataset by Thomson et al. (2012). In comparing these factors, there appears to 
be a link between the support for the EU from the state ' s population and the successful 
advancement of the state 's priorities. 
Vlll 
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Introduction 
This thesis will cover the history of the European Union (EU) Council 
Presidency position, reviewing its roles and tasks, and examining what scholars 
describe makes an effective Presidency. The EU Council Presidency position falls 
within the Council of the European Union, also known as the Council of Ministers. 
Along with the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union is one part of 
the legislature of the EU. The Council takes many different shapes: depending on which 
topic is being discussed, the ministers of that subject from each member state meet and 
are led by the representative of the member state holding the Presidency. 
This paper specifically looks at small states in the Presidency, as explored 
previously by Simone Bunse (2009) in her book Small States and EU Governance: 
Leadership through the Council Presidency and in an article by Diana Panke (2010). 1 
Small states are important to study in relation to the Presidency because they "have 
fiercely defended the rotating office" and their opportunity to hold the position, even 
though "critics [have] claimed that small states are overburdened" by the various tasks 
it requires (Bunse, 2009, p. 1). In most cases, small states face disadvantages in 
promoting their national position within the Council because they "lack the political 
power to shape EU directives or regulations in the same manner as their larger 
counterparts " (Panke, 2010, p. 799) . The Presidency is an opportunity to gain a voice 
within the EU and shape the agenda. Much analysis covering the Presidency and 
Council of Ministers examines the power of large states in the European Union and how 
they affect decision-making. For example, some study how a Franco-German alliance 
1 As covered later in the paper , there are many definitions of "small states " in the context of the EU . 
For the purpose of this paper, I will use the definition that Panke (2010) offers , states that have less than 
the average number of votes in the Council of Ministers . 
1 
can overpower voting on initiatives and proposals (Simonian, 1985, cited by Bunse, 
2009, p. 59). The dominant focus of EU Presidency literature and the restricted latitude 
for smaller states to shape the EU's legislative agenda make sma11 state Council 
Presidencies especially significant and worthy of closer investigation. The goal of this 
paper is to examine three cases from the late 2000s- Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and 
Sweden- and score how they advanced their priorities, while also comparing this score 
to other factors that can affect Presidency performance. 
The role of the Presidency has evolved over time, changing with the 
introduction of new treaties and the addition of new member states to the EU. The 
Presidency gained power and prestige in 1974 when the Council of the European Union 
became an independent institution (Crwn, 2009, p. 689). The Presidency is significant 
because "The strategic decisions made by the European Council Presidency are likely to 
trickle all the way down through the Council structure" (Crum, 2009, p. 690). The trio 
system of the rotating presidency was introduced in 2007, which grouped Presidencies 
together based on diversity in size, experience and geographic location, and increased 
continuity between Presidencies by coordinating priorities within the trio (Bukowski, 
2009, p. 97). The most recent change was implemented in 2009 under the Lisbon 
Treaty, which reduced the Presidency's role. A pennanent President, elected to a two 
and a half year term, replaced the rotating position in the European Council. Even 
considering the recent changes and reduction in its role, the long-standing Presidency 
position remains an important player in the leadership and creation of policy in the EU. 
The Presidency position entails many tasks and functions for the host state, the 
first of which is leadership and coordination within the Council of Ministers and until 
2 
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2009, the European Council. The Presidency is expected to present proposals , guide 
policy and arrange smrunits , among other tasks (Elgstrom , 2003 , p. 3; Mix , 2010 , p. 4). 
Another crucial role is that of the mediator or broker between member states with 
differing positions on proposed legislation (Elgstrom , 2003 , p. 6). The Presidency 
works to coordinate agreement and cooperation on policy . Under the norm of 
impartiality , the Presidency is expected to put the general interests of the EU above the 
state ' s own domestic political interests . Impartiality is not always followed , however , 
and a country can influence the agenda in many ways while holding the Presidency . It is 
also important to note that pursuing national interest does not always mean pursuing 
specific domestic political preferences . Instead , it may be in a state ' s national interest to 
act as a more neutral Presidency because a successful , neutral Presidency can buffer a 
state ' s reputation and credibility in tenns of EU decision-making . 
Some Presidencies appear to perform better than others. While most measures of 
success are very subjective , some scholars look at the nmnber of decisions passed or 
whether these decisions coincided with the Presidency state ' s position on the issue (e.g. 
Thomson & Hosli , 2006 ). Some Pres idencies are more focused on the state ' s own 
political interests while others attempt to be more of a true neutral broker. Presidencies 
also vary in their configuration: for example , the 2003 Italian Presidency "relied on an 
informal system of co-ordination ... rather than creating a fonnal co-ordinating unit 
amongst the various ministries ," while the 2004 Irish Presidency took a more formal 
approach to organization , according to Quaglia & Moxon-Browne (2006 , p. 352). 
Several factors can explain variation in Presidency behavior and outcomes . These 
3 
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include previous Presidency experience, upcoming elections , their population ' s support 
for the EU and integration , and the domestic political landscape . 
I evaluated each of the three small state Presidency cases based on its relative 
success in advancing priorities , on a scale of zero to ten . The Czech Republic scored the 
lowest with 5 points , Slovenia was awarded 7 points and Sweden came in at the top 
with 8 points . These states ' Presidencies varied in many ways including the number of 
priorities they created , in the relative complexity or moderacy of the priorities , in the 
domestic and EU political circumstances surrounding their presidency terms and the 
level of EU experience they have . I compared the total score of their judged priorities to 
five different factors including experience and upcoming elections, a factor that is 
related to the domestic political scene . It appears there may be a relationship between 
the EU support of a country and the advancement of its priorities , but further testing 
would be necessary to confirm this indication. Other possible explanations could 
include the strength of their civil service , measured possibly by the share of civil service 
positions allocated based on competitive examination, or cooperation with the other trio 
members . 
Small states play a very different role from some of the major actors in the EU 
because they have fewer resources to put toward the Presidency . On the other hand , 
they also may have more to gain from the position. Sma11 states typically benefit from 
holding the Presidency because the term can augment their influence and reputation 
among other member states in the Council. A reputation of a member that will 
cooperate may provide more leverage and greater trust from other states in bargaining . 
The 2009 Slovenian Presidency exceeded expectations and enhanced its reputation 
4 
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(Bukowski , 2009 ). On the other hand , an unsuccessful Presidency could damage a 
state ' s reputation "and affect its future ability to successfully pursue its foreign policy 
objectives " (Bukowski , 2009 , p. 99) . Hoyland and Hansen (2013 ) emphasize the 
importance of trust and reputation : "Because of the high frequency of meetings and 
negotiations ... reputation matters a lot" (p. 2) . Small states seem to have more to gain or 
lose from holding the Presidency than large states. It is an important opportunity to lead 
EU decision-making. 
According to Bunse (2009) , there are "a mnnber of gaps in our understanding of 
the Council presidency " because "most work ... focuses on [the presidency's] legal 
status and formal functions " and other works are comprised of single country case 
studies (p. 2) . This article may contribute to a better understanding of the Presidency 
position in general , and how sma11 states operate within the Presidency in specific. 
5 
Chapter 2: The EU Council Presidency 
This section first covers a brief history of the European Union , its setup and the 
Council of Ministers over which the Presidency presides . The history of the Presidency 
is presented , and then topics including the role of the Presidency , its functions , how it 
influences the agenda and how scholars explain variation are covered. 
History of the European Union 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is the foundation that led to 
the organization of the EU over time . Six countries - West Germany , France, Italy , 
Belgiwn , the Netherlands and Luxembourg-established the ECSC in April 1951. The 
organizational features of the ECSC included a parliamentary assembly, a court , a 
council and a supranational administration , which developed into many of the 
institutions and the general structure of the EU today (Nedergaard , 2007 , p. 45) . 
The European Economic Community (EEC) , founded in 1957, shared much of 
the same institutional setup as the ECSC . As European cooperation developed and 
progressed , much was modeled on the original ECSC (Nedergaard , 2007 , p. 48) . The 
Merger Treaty in 1965 created a common Commission and Council of Ministers for the 
ECSC, the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community. 
Over the years the breadth of European cooperation and the membership of 
these communities increased . In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty established the European 
Union with twelve member states . Various treaties have enlarged the number of 
members to 28, Croatia becoming the newest in July 2013 . The administration of the 
EU is a mix between national and international features , and has both federalist and 
intergovernmental traits (Nedergaard , 2007 , p. 8). 
6 
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History of the Council of the European Union 
The Council of the European Union works with the European Parliament in 
what is essentially a bicameral legislature of the EU. The Council of the European 
Union is also referred to as "the Council " or the Council of Ministers. It differs from the 
European Council , 2 which is comprised of the heads of states or governments of the EU . 
There are many different configurations of the Council of the European Union , 
depending on the subject being discussed. The ministers of the specific subject from 
each member state meet , and are led by the representative from the member state 
holding the Presidency. In cooperation with the European Parliament, the Council is the 
main decision-making body of the EU (Nedergaard, 2007, p. 59). 
Ole Elgstrom (2003) calls the Council of the European Union "the foremost site 
of intergovernmental activism in the EU," contrasting it with the "supranational 
Commission and the directly elected European Parliament" (p. 3). It is important to 
note , though , that the Council has supranational features too: Bunse (2009) labels it 
"supranational in its operation and an institution in its own right ," pointing to the 
expectation to "broker compromises acceptable to all other decision-makers within a 
culture of consensus " (p. 39). The system of weighted voting , qualified majority voting, 
makes bargaining and compromise an essential part of decision-making in the Council , 
enriching the influence of the Presidency as a mediator and broker. The Council is part 
of a body of institutions that develop and finalize legal acts of the EU. These acts take 
three forms: regulations that are direct and binding at the EU level , directives that are 
2 Since 1975 the European Council was an informal instih1tion, and became an official institution 
with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 . It is led by a permanent President with a term of two 
and a half yea rs- currently held by Herman von Rompuy - rather than being part of the rotating 
Presidency , as a result of the Lisbon Treaty . 
7 
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legally binding but must be incorporated into the national law of member states , and 
decisions that are binding but more specific in their focus or application (Nedergaard , 
2007 , pp . 52-54 ). 
The executive body of the European Union , the European Commission , holds 
the "almost exclusive right to initiate legislative proposals ," whjch are presented to the 
European Parliament and then passed onto the Council of Ministers (Thomson & Hosli , 
2006 , p. 14). The Council is permitted to request that the Commission introduce a 
legislative proposal , but the Presidency plays a larger role in setting and controlling the 
agenda than the introduction of topics (Nedergaard , 2007 , p. 59) . The Presidency may 
propose topics for general policy debates , however (Tallberg , 2006, p. 50) . Through the 
co-decision process , the Council and the European Parliament work together on 
legislative compromises (Rasmussen , 2011, p. 44) . On most topics the Council and the 
Parliament both have to agree for proposals to pass, but on some subjects - such as 
budget or home affairs - one body can decide on its own . Whereas the Council 
represents member states , the Parliament represents EU citizens because the people 
directly elect its members (Nedergaard , 2007 , p. 118). While the Parliament has gained 
influence , it still lacks the right to initiate legislation and according to Nedergaard , most 
legislative powers lie with the Council (2007 , p. 59) . 
Member state representatives in the Council of Ministers negotiate solutions and 
often form consensus through tms bargaining and compromise . While some decisions 
are made via qualified majority voting , Hoyland and Hansen point to voting records that 
reveal "high levels of unanimous votes even in policy areas where a qualified majority 
of the weighted votes would have sufficed " as evidence of the culture of consensus 
8 
within the Council (2013 , pp. 1-2). The weightings of qualified majority voting consider 
population size but are designed to over-represent small states and under-represent large 
ones to create a more even playing field (Bunse, 2009 , p. 21 ). The number of votes each 
country is allotted is adjusted as new member states join. Overall , bargaining is of 
critical importance because of the number of decisions that are passed through forming 
consensus. The Presidency plays an important role in working to form consensus 
through negotiation. 
History of the EU Council Presidency 
The Presidency position within the Council of Ministers dates back to the 1951 
Treaty of Paris that "stated each government would hold the Council [of Ministers of 
the European Communities] chair for three months in rotation and that it would be 
responsible for convening meetings " (Bunse, 2009 , p. 31) . The 1957 Treaty of Rome 
designated a six-month term length for the Presidency (Alexandrova & Timmermans, 
2013, p. 318) . The Presidency position is an example of an EU institution that provides 
some equality among the member states (Bunse , 2009 , p. 28). It rotates between all 
member states , allowing both large and small countries the opportunity to guide EU 
legislation . According to Elgstrom (2003), "holding the Presidency automatically places 
a country at the centre of the EU negotiation processes " (p. 3 ). The rotating Presidency 
is also important because it "has ensured non-hierarchical and decentralized leadership 
of the Council " (Bunse, 2009 , p. 38) . 
In order to counter some of the disruption of the Presidency changing twice a 
year, the EU began in 2007 a "trio" or "troika " system of three Presidencies that work 
together to form coordinated preparation and work programs , with the intent of 
9 
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enhancing continuity (Bukowski , 2009, p. 97; Batory and Puetter , 2013, p. 96). While 
the rotation set-up of the Presidency originally followed alphabetical order, member 
states are now arranged with consideration of a number of factors , including experience , 
size, geographic location and economic differences (Bukowski , 2009, p. 97) The three 
member states that make up each trio of Presidencies work together to form a more 
cohesive program for the 18-month span of their Presidency tenns . Each country creates 
its own work program with individual priorities, but the trio group forms common 
themes to plan around . 
The role of the Presidency has changed over time. According to Bunse (2009) , it 
evolved from more of an administrative position to taking on a position of leadership (p. 
19). The position has become more tasking with the addition of new member states. 
Quaglia and Moxon-Browne (2006) assert that "The functions of business manager and 
mediator have become more important" with such increases (p. 351). With more 
members , "the evolution of the EU 's voting system and increased diversity has made 
coalition-building more complicated ," according to Bunse (2009, p. 59). The role of the 
Presidency changed most recently under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. Previously, the 
Council Presidency ruled over both the Council of Ministers and the European Council. 
This meant that the head of state of the presiding country led the European Council. The 
Lisbon Treaty removed some of the responsibilities of the Presidency and it now 
presides only over the Council of the European Union. When political leaders of larger 
member states proposed the permanent European Council position , smaller states were 
skeptical of the loss of responsibility and power the Presidency would face (Crum, 
2009, p. 686). Small member states "feared that [the position] ... might become an agent 
10 
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of the bigger member states" (Crum, 2009, p. 686). The impetus behind the change was 
that the EU decision-making process appeared to have become increasingly difficult 
(Dinan, 2010, p. 97). Dinan notes that the changes under the Lisbon Treaty limit the 
role of the Presidency , but categorizes the treaty as "a reasonable balance between 
institutional efficiency and democratic legitimacy" (2010, p. 98). One key change is the 
designation of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy , removing 
the influence of Presidency leadership on the topic to an extent (Batory & Puetter, 2013, 
p. 106). 
While Batory and Puetter (2013) argue that the organization of the trio and the 
changes derived from the Lisbon Treaty lead to a reduction in importance and visibility 
of individual Presidencies , it may be too soon to determine the actual effects. The trio 
system enhances the coordination of planning and preparation, but each Presidency 
seems to add its own flavor and is known better for what it accomplished individually 
than what the trio as a whole achieved. This "flavor" is apparent in the priorities and 
interests promoted by Presidencies . For example, the 2003 Greek Presidency 
emphasized a Western Balkans agenda, focused at integration and refonn (Bunse, 2009, 
pp. 167-8). The 2009 Czech Presidency is not only remembered for the collapse of the 
country 's government during the Presidency term, but also a colorful art display 
depicting stereotypes of EU member states. It portrayed "Germany as a swastika-shaped 
autobahn network and Romania as a Dracula theme park," (Barber, 2009) . The artwork 
received criticism "especially from countries such as Bulgaria [portrayed as a toilet] 
who felt the sculpture had gone beyond a provocative joke and was merely offensive " 
(Benes and Karlas , 2010, p. 71). This "flavor" may also be observed in how countries 
11 
approach the Presidency position. For example , the 1997 Netherlands ' Presidency , took 
a more modest , "subservient " approach to running the Presidenc y than others (van 
Keulen and Rood , 2003, p. 82). 
Roles and Functions of the Presidency 
The Presidenc y has many tasks to handle in its six-month term. Provisional 
standing orders in 1958 designate the position ' s duties, which included chairing 
meetings , drafting minutes , signing docwnents and representing the Council (Bunse , 
2009, p. 31 ). Many of its tasks today are similar to these original ones. In the book 
Europ ean Union Council Presidencies: A Comparative Persp ective, Ole Elgstrom 
(2003) lists four main functions of the Presidency : Administration and coordination , 
Setting political priorities , Mediation and Representation (pp. 5-7). The Presidency 
organizes and leads meetings , establishes priorities or areas of focus, negotiates deals 
and solutions to coordinate agreement on legislation , and represents the Council to other 
EU bodies and to other countries in international forums. 
While the Presidency is responsible for leading decision-making in the EU, it is 
expected to do so impartially. The Presidency position , in theory , is not to be used to 
push a state's own agenda . Instead, the Presidency is a leader and mediator , arranging 
meetings and guiding cooperation (Mix, 2010; Bunse , 2009; Bukowski , 2009). An EU 
official interviewed by Elgstrom (2003) explained that the position "is a chairman , not a 
president" and "should concentrate on 'moving things forward "' (p. 50). In leading 
discussion , the Presidency may highlight certain issues it feels do not receive adequate 
attention, but is to remain neutral and not force a side on those issues. 
12 
Leader. First and foremost, the Presidency serves as a leader, "providing visions 
of the future and guiding the integration process towards these new goals " (Elgstrom, 
2003 , p. 1 ). It is expected to present policy priorities and proposals, coordinate progress 
on legislation and arrange summits, among other duties (Mix , 2010 , p. 4). One of the 
necessary traits for a successful presidency is a strong understanding of EU bureaucracy 
and configuration (Quaglia & Moxon-Browne, 2006, p. 362 ; Bukowski, 2009, p. 97). 
According to Bukowski, the Presidency position "require[s] a so1id grasp of the 
subtleties of EU policy-making" because it chairs meetings of the Council of Ministers 
at its various levels including the Committee of Permanent Representatives (2009, pp. 
97-98). Without such knowledge , a Presidency will struggle to organize and lead in an 
effective manner . The Presidency has access to a resource that can provide information 
and guide the Presidency state through the process: the Council Secretariat 3 (Thomson, 
2008a , p. 597) . The Council Secretariat creates a briefing book for the incoming 
Presidency , with an explanation of where in the decision-making process different 
pieces of legislation are, what topics must be debated and obstacles that may arise 
(Nedergaard, 2007, p. 156). Additionally , the Secretariat provides logistical support , 
advice and assistance in coordination (EU Presidency Handbook, 2011, pp . 12-13) . 
Because the three cases discussed later all began before the implementation of 
the Lisbon Treaty , the description of the roles, tasks and functions of the Presidency 
will focus on those dictated through treaties such as the Maastricht Treaty, prior to the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. For example, the Lisbon Treaty reduced the 
Council Presidency ' s role in relation to foreign affairs policy but that change is 
3 The Council Secretariat , also known as the General Secretariat of the Council , is a body of officials 
responsible for assisting the European Council and the Council of Ministers . 
13 
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excluded from the analysis of the case studies. According to Drieskens (2011 ), the 2010 
Belgian Presidency "experience confirmed that the rotating Presidency remains a 
crucial actor in EU decision-making ," confirming that even with these changes 
stemming from the Lisbon Treaty the Presidency remains an important position to study 
(p. 100). 
Administration and coordination. In leading the Council of Ministers and the 
European Council , the Presidency is responsible for organizing and running meetings in 
its state and in Brussels. The Presidency country "chairs meetings at all levels of 
intergovernmental negotiation , from working parties with member state and 
Commission officials , and Coreper with their ambassadors, to Council ministerial 
meetings and summits , involving heads of governments and states " (Elgstrom , 2003 , 
p.3) . Bunse (2009) estimates the number of meetings run by a Presidency during its six-
month term to be between 1,500 and 2,000 (p. 45) , whereas Bukowski (2009) 
approximates it closer to 4,000 meetings (p. 98). Elgstrom (2003) also notes that the 
duties that fall under administration and coordination have increased with each 
enlargement of the EU. The Presidency has more to coordinate and holding the position 
has become more taxing. 
Setting political priorities. One of the tasks of the Presidency is to prepare a list 
of priorities for its term (Elgstrom, 2003 , p. 6) . These priorities are published in the 
form of a Work Program but are also referred to throughout speeches , reports and the 
Presidency websites . Priorities often evolve through preparation. For example , the 2009 
Czech Republic began with five priorities in October 2007 , but narrowed them down to 
three somewhat broader ones the following year (Karlas, 2009 , p. 10). Policy 
14 
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developments and unanticipated circumstances at the EU-level result in changes in what 
the Presidency country views as realistic , which can prompt the adjustment of priorities . 
The Czech Presidency dropped a priority centered around budget reform because "the 
EU agenda had changed and it did not seem any more reasonable to push the reform 
through in the first half of 2009 " (Kar las, 2009, p. 11). Priorities may differ between 
member states along regional, socio-economic or constitutional lines (Elgstrom , 2003 , 
p. 11 ). As examples of variation in socio-economic priorities, Elgstrom points to 
countries that emphasize the environment (e.g. the 2009 Swedish Presidency) or those 
that highlight gender equality (e.g. the trio group of Ireland , Lithuania and Greece) . 
Regional variation may include highlighting issues occurring in the state ' s local region, 
or emphasizing a region the state has interests in, such as the 2001 Belgian Presidency 
and its attention to conflict prevention in the African Great Lakes region (Bunse, 2009, 
p. 117). 
In 1993, the Presidency officially received the right to "propose issues for 
general policy debates " (Tallberg, 2006, p. 50), which allows for more influence over 
policy initiation (Allerkamp, 2010 , p. 7). As mentioned , the Commission almost always 
must introduce a legislative proposal , but the Council is permitted to request proposals. 
The Presidency may use these tools to set and develop policy priorities . 
Mediation. The Presidency also acts as a mediator between member states and 
their representatives in the European Council and the various forms of the Council of 
Ministers . Decisions are often made through forming a consensus , although voting can 
be carried out in the Council through either unanimous or qualified-majority voting. 
15 
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The Presidency coordinates member states through negotiation and coalition building 
within the Council to acquire enough votes to pass issues . 
The Council is divided into three main levels: the ministerial level at the top, the 
level of the Committee of the Permanent Representative of the Member States 
(Coreper) in the middle , comprised of ambassadors and deputies representing the 
member states, and working groups at the bottom (Thomson and Hosli, 2006, p. 16). 
The Presidency country representative manages meetings at all levels . Once the 
Commission makes a proposal that covers an area in which the Council has "decision-
making competency" and the European Parliament offers a decision on it, the Council 
begins processing the proposal in working groups (Nedergaard, 2007, p. 164). It is then 
sent to Coreper and subsequently onto the ministerial level. Decision-making can be a 
lengthy process of negotiation because of the Council ' s goal of reaching consensus 
(Nedergaard, 2007, pp. 166, 171). The Presidency plays a large role in facilitating 
negotiation and compromises . According to Nedergaard , package deals are sometimes 
created in which one member state may request support for a certain proposal from a 
second member state, in exchange for its future support on a different proposal (2007, 
pp. 172-173 ). These informal deals can be useful in forming agreement within the 
Council or between the Council and the European Parliament (Kardasheva, 2009 , p. 3). 
Representation. The Presidency is responsible for representing the Council of 
Ministers both internally and externally: within the EU to other institutions , and to 
represent the Council and the EU more broadly in conferences or summits with third 
countries (Elgstrom, 2003 , p. 7). A task of the Presidency is to form consensus within 
the EU and represent this position in international forums (Bengtsson, 2003 ). One 
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aspect of internal representation is the responsibility of the Presidency to represent the 
Council in its dealings with the other legislative body of the EU, the European 
Parliament (Thomson & Hosli , 2006 , p. 17). There are certain subjects on which the 
Presidency acts as the external representative for the EU as a whole . Prior to the 
changes under the Lisbon Treaty, the Presidency was responsible as the external 
representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy for representing the EU 
internationally and "acting as an EU spokesperson" on foreign policy topics (Bengtsson, 
2003, p. 59). Another example of external representation is the 2009 Swedish 
Presidency , which was responsible for acting as the EU representative in the 
Copenhagen Conference on climate change. According to Bengtsson, the Presidency ' s 
role of external representation has "developed incrementally, much more in response to 
political developments than to formal regulations " (2003, p. 68). Representation-both 
within the EU and outside it- is a crucial role of the Presidency that can help build or 
can damage a country's reputation . 
Neutral broker. In order to be a credible and trusted leader, the Presidency 
should also act as a neutral broker. Elgstrom (2003) notes , "The norm that the 
Presidency should be neutral and impartial is almost uncontested, among practitioners 
as well as among academic writers " (p. 39), although that does not mean neutrality is 
always obvious or present in practice . Neutrality is important because it aids in 
establishing cooperation, trust and credibility among member states (Bunse, 2009 , p. 
43). The Presidency is to distance itself from its own preferences and avoid expressing 
favoritism to the preferences of another member state (Bunse, 2009 , p. 43) . A 
successful Presidency can strengthen a state ' s reputation in EU diplomacy (Schalk, 
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Torenvlied , Weesie & Stokman , 2007) , and therefore many states are attentive to 
neutrality. Presidency states may follow the norm of neutrality because "non-
compliance could compromise one ' s reputation or provoke non-co-operation from other 
governments " (Verhoeff & Niemann , 201 1, p. 1276). On the other hand , compliance 
with the norm may increase opportunities for cooperation and bargaining once the 
state ' s Presidency term is over. In a survey of Swedish officials related to the 
Presidency by Brattberg , Rhinard and Kajnc (2011) , 73.5 percent stated that reaching 
agreements took precedence over Swedish interests - indicating the neutral broker role 
seemed more important to them than advocating for their own state ' s interests (p. 22). 
According to Elgstrom (2003) , commission officials prefer the Presidency to be run 
primarily out of Brussels , rather than the host country ' s capital , because it enhances 
coordination with the Commission and whereas Presidencies hosted in a capital city are 
"more prone to be attentive to their own national interests " (p . 5). Enhanced 
coordination with the Commission is important because it has the primary ability to 
introduce legislative proposals . 
The struggle with the norm of impartiality 4 is more obvious in situations in 
which the issue is highly contentious or the Presidency country is in a minority position. 
As Elgstrom (2003) explains , such a situation results in a dilemma between the 
Presidenc y state either giving up its resistance to the issue or protecting national 
interests but not acting impartially (p. 50). This dilemma also includes the balance 
between protecting a state ' s policy interest on a certain position versus the self-interest 
of earning or maintaining the status of a credible , neutral broker. There can be domestic 
4 Note that while there ma y be distinctions between neutrali ty and impartiality in certain uses of the 
term , I am us ing the two interchan geably here . 
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consequences for giving up resistance to a certain issue , such as loss of popularity for 
the political party or coalition in power , but consequences exjst at the EU -level in terms 
of reputation and cooperation prospects as well . The state must weigh the two and 
detennine which is more important. One solution E lgstrom points to in this situation is 
for the Presidency to delay a decision on such legislation until it is out of office and the 
next term has begun (Elgstrom , 2003 , p. 50). Then , the Presidency would no longer be 
constrained by the impartiality norm. Elgstrom also notes that "partiality under certain 
circumstances is permitted , or even expected , despite the impact of the very strong 
impartiality norm " (2003 , p. 38). One such circumstance is when the Presidency ' s 
national position is in alignment with the majority position. It may allowably push for 
the majority position in order to form consensus (Elgstrom , 2003 , p. 50) . On the other 
hand , Elgstrom adds , "A blatant advocacy of obvious self-interests is . .. not tolerated " 
(2003 , p . 39). States may criticize another for instances of partiality and may be more 
reluctant to cooperate with that state . 
Large states tend to be more partial than small states , argues Elgstrom, or they 
may at least be "more prone to intervene actively in favour of their own interests " 
(2003 , p. 49). He points to France as an especially "outspoken proponent " of its 
interests (Elgstrom , 2003 , p. 49 ). Large states may have less to lose in terms of 
credibility because they are already powerful and have a larger proportion of votes in 
the Council. They are more likely to attempt unilateral action than small states (Quaglia 
& Moxon-Browne , 2006 , p. 362). According to Elgstrom (2003 ), large states typically 
have more precise positions on issues , whereas small states sometimes have less 
national interest on certain topics and a wider range of acceptable outcomes. 
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Even a state that is impartial overall may have certain issues that are more 
contentious and salient , and will work harder to defend specific positions on those 
issues. Bunse describes the 1998 Austrian Presidency as an example , which was "seen 
as a defender of national interests " on certain issues such as employment , tax and 
security affairs , while "a passive , honest broker " on initiatives in other areas (2009, p. 
48). Another example is the 2000 French Presidency, "a genuine broker in the 
negotiations on the flexibility dossier. .. [but] strongly biased in case of extending 
QMV" (Bunse , 2009, p. 48). Bunse (2009) explains , "the government holding the 
presidency may only be a genuine neutral broker in dossiers where it has few key 
interests at stake or when its concerns are close to the centre ground" (p. 48) . Lapses in 
impartiality may be expected or common on certain issues, like foreign policy . Two 
examples of partiality related to foreign affairs include "the 1998 UK Presidency 
aligned [that] itself with the American position threatening military action in Iraq 
without any previous consultation " of the rest of the Union , and as a "Italian PM Silvio 
Berlusconi [who] made little effort to play an even hand in the Middle East conflict 
under his 2003 presidency " because he is a strong ally of Israel (2009 , p. 47). The norm 
of neutrality may constrain Presidencies in some circumstances , but in others the 
Presidency may determine that a certain policy outcome is more important than 
adhering to the norm, regardless of implications to cooperation or reputation . 
What it Means for the Host Country 
Holding the Presidency provides status and an opportunity to influence the 
agenda, but has certain costs associated as well. Member states, especially sma11 ones, 
appear to welcome the opportunity to take part in the Presidency because it is an 
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opportunity to lead the Council that all states receive. The Presidency position offers 
equality that is not attained elsewhere: it is more equal than the weighted votes in the 
Council of Ministers or the composition of the European Commission, according to 
Bunse (2009, p. 19). Major proponents for the abolition of the Presidency position in 
the early 2000s were French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, heads of large states (Bunse, 2009, p. 31). They eventually succeeded making the 
President of the European Council a permanent position. According to Crum (2009), 
small states met the proposal for a permanent president over the European Council 
"with considerable skepticism," fearing the advantages it would provide the larger 
member states (p. 686). Small states defended the Presidency because the position is 
considered an "important safeguard against such a big state directorate and for the 
interests of the EU ' s small states" (Bunse, 2009, pp. 30-31). Overall, the benefits of 
holding the Presidency - the opportunity to build reputation and credibility and the 
potential to influence the EU's agenda or highlight certain topics-outweigh the costs, 
as evidenced by the importance many states place on the position. 
The Presidency requires a large amount of resources expended by the host 
country, both in terms of financial expenditures as well as personnel and time. For 
administrative and policy coordination , countries hire hundreds of new staff members. 5 
In the case of Slovenia , many of these new hires filled in as substitutes for civil servants 
who were busy with or relocated for Presidency work (Fink-Hafner & Lajh, 2008, p. 
40). The financial burden is also high for less wealthy member states (Bunse, 2009, p. 
5 The Swedish Presidency hired 200 extra staff to handle the workload , according to their post-
Presidency report. The Czech Presidency hired 378 new civil servants , according to the "Czech 
Presidency by the numbers " press release . Over 1,500 Czech civil servants in total worked on the 
Presidency 
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45) . Bunse notes that Finland spent between 50 and 60 million euros and Ireland spent 
90 million during their Presidencies in 1999 and 2004, respectively (2009 , pp. 45-46). 
Both the financial and administrative burden can strain the foreign ministry as well as 
other segments of the member state, which can be a large burden for small states, 
according to Nedergaard (2007 , p. 147). 
On the other hand, the host country benefits in that it receives certain resources 
when holding the Presidency. For example, it has the aid of the Council Secretariat to 
provide guidance on policy and bureaucratic issues . The Council Secretariat can offer 
the Presidency its assessment of discussions between member states, knowledge of 
attitudes and proposals of alternatives (Bunse , 2009 , p. 68). According to Bunse, the 
technical and legal advice the Secretariat can provide is especially helpful to small 
states (2009 , p. 68) . Another resource available to the Presidency is information 
received through "confessionals " which are confidential talks with representatives of 
other member states "to establish where a compromise may be found and what the 
margins of manoeuvre are" (Bunse , 2009 , p. 54). These confessionals genuinely aid in 
negotiation but can also provide a clear advantage to the Presidency in knowing the 
positions and limits of various member states (Wamtjen, 2008b , p. 317) . This privileged 
knowledge can help Presidencies avoid deadlock in negotiation and "enables presidents 
to formulate proposals that are acceptable to other Member States" (Thomson, 2008a , p. 
597). These resources provide an advantage to the Presidency as a mediator but also as 
a representative of its national policy interests . They can augment the Presidency ' s 
ability to influence the agenda and policy outcomes. 
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Another advantage of holding the Presidency , especially for small countries or 
newer EU member states , is the potential to demonstrate reliability and bui]d credibility 
in terms of EU bargaining . For example , after many financial and political scandals in 
Spain , the 1995 Presidency "was seen as an opportunity to try to polish the tarnished 
image of the government in the eyes of the public " (Morata & Fernandez , 2003 , p. 181). 
Presidencies viewed as successful by representatives of other member states and EU 
officials may build support or partners for future cooperation. Lastly , the Presidency is 
an opportunity for new member states to gain knowledge and experience in EU 
decision-making and bureaucracy : according to Batory and Puetter , "by co-drafting the 
joint programme the civil servants in Budapest ' developed an EU perspective and 
learned to think like a president "' (2012 , p. 104 ). 
Influencing the Agenda 
While the norm of neutrality may dictate to what extent Presidency holders 
compete for their own domestic political interests , it is c01nmonly accepted that the 
Presidency does influence the agenda overall (Tallberg , 2003 ; Wamtjen 2008b ; Schalk 
et al., 2007) . The ability to highlight certain issues and bring proposals to the Council 
via the Commission is a reason the position is so va]ued, especia]]y among smaller 
member states . For example , the Slovenian Presidency brought heightened attention to 
conflict in the Balkans (S]ovenian Presidency of the European Union, 2007) . 
Perceptions of the Presidency 's role in influencing the agenda vary , however. Tallberg 
argues , "existing literature operates with a narrow understanding of agenda-shaping 
which causes it to underestimate the Presidency ' s means to influence EU policy " (2003 , 
p. 18). He instead emphasizes the differences between the various ways a Presidency 
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can affect an agenda : through setting , structuring and exclusion (Tallberg , 2003 , p. 21 ). 
According to Ta11berg, through the management of meetings in the Council , a 
Presidency can introduce topics of discussion (agenda-setting) , it can highlight or avoid 
certain issues that are already present on the agenda (agenda-structuring) , or it can block 
specific topics from being part of the discussion (agenda-exclusion) (2003 , p. 21 ). 
Advancing national interests. Many domestic actors see the Presidency as an 
opportunity to advance national interests , or at least bring attention to issues that may be 
overlooked (Elgstrom, 2003 ; Tallberg , 2003) . Advancing the Presidency country ' s 
interests can occur during early stages in legislation through presenting proposals for 
debate , or later during the negotiation or adoption phases of a proposal. A top-level 
European Commission officer , interviewed by Tallberg , argues that countries overstep 
the limits of the neutrality norm , and others allow it because they know one day it will 
be their turn to lead and do the same (Tallberg, 2003, p. 33). Neutrality is not a hard and 
fast rule ; Presidencies are still biased toward their own interests and sometimes act upon 
these biases . Partiality is acceptable and even expected in some cases . 
Agenda-shaping. A Presidency inherits its agenda to an extent: much 
legislation is already in process when a new Presidency state begins its tenn and factors 
like the EU political landscape or external events may affect policy focus during the 
Presidency term (Tallberg , 2003 ; Warntjen , 2008b ). Bunse (2009) explains , 
"Unfinished initiatives have to be continued and the general Community timetable 
(including annual budgetary and agricultural price reviews or the renewal of external 
trade and co-operation agreements) has to be followed " (p. 44) . Nonetheless , the 
Presidency can shape the agenda in many ways . Tallberg uses the term "agenda-
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shaping" to cover agenda-setting , agenda-structuring and agenda-exclusion (2003 , p. 
21 ). The Presidency can designate certain topics for discussion , or request a proposal 
from the Commission on policy it may want to pass . Such policy proposals may stem 
from a common interest designated by the trio group of Presidencies , from the 
individual Presidency ' s work program, or may instead be sparked by an external event 
(for example, security policy work after an international crisis) . While it is possible for 
the Presidency to initiate or promote new policies , it can also shape the agenda by 
limiting policy choices or making them appear unfavorable (Bunse, 2009, p. 49) . A 
Presidency could hinder progress by adding generally unfavorable additions to the 
proposal , for example. Slowing progress is a more subtle way of fighting a proposal 
than blocking it completely , but another way the Presidency could negatively impact 
decision-making would be to actively or passively leave items off the agenda (Bunse, 
2009, p. 49). Neither of these options lack consequences, however. According to a 
British official interviewed by Bunse it would be "unwise" for a state to ignore a 
specific agenda request of another state (2009, p. 49). Such a decision could be costly 
for a state' s reputation and also could impact the prospects for cooperation in the future. 
A Presidency can make positive progress on an agenda item by highlighting the 
issue in various settings , including the different levels and configurations of the Council 
of Ministers . The Presidency is in charge of chairing formal and informal meetings at 
all levels , settings in which it can highlight an issue and devote discussion to it 
(Tallberg , 2003 ). Another example of emphasizing an issue is to draw attention to a 
topic by including it in the Presidency work program. These practices fall under agenda-
setting and agenda-structuring . 
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Pace. According to Thomson , the pace of decision-making is another area in 
which the Presidency can levy influence. He notes that the Presidency can do this by 
"adjusting the levels of priority given to issues and by introducing proposals for 
compromises " (2008a , p. 597) . For example , if a Presidency ranks one issue higher than 
others in terms of priorities , it may work harder to finalize legislation on that issue 
during its Presidency . In another scenario , if the Presidency knows that the upcoming 
Presidency state is favorable to a certain issue and trusts the issue will pass under that 
Presidency , it may relax the pace on that issue while prioritizing others for the time 
being . Once its Presidency tenn is complete , the country could fight whole-heartedly for 
its policy preference on that issue, unconstrained by the nonns of neutrality . Two or 
more countries could arrange an informal agreement to exchange support on topics in a 
similar way. Strong, effective leadership may also affect the pace of decision -making . 
By acting as a formidable leader , the 2002 Danish Presidency quickly formed 
agreement on EU enlargement , a topic that many states were unenthusiastic about 
moving forward on (European Stability Initiative , n.d.) . 
Limitations. There are many limitations that can affect the extent to which a 
Presidency guides or shapes policy . One example is the short length of the Presidency 
term. Six months is almost always too short a period to introduce and finalize 
legislation . The process to fonn and adopt a proposal usually passes through multiple 
Presidency periods (Thomson , 2008a ; Elgstrom , 2003 ; Tallberg , 2003 ; Manners , 2003). 
Internal EU and external events are other factors . No Presidency can anticipate what 
issues or crises will arise during its term. For the 201 I Hungarian Presidency , 
unexpected events included the earthquake and resulting tsunamis in Japan as well as 
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the uprisings in Libya that prompted a wave of migration to Europe (Agh, 2012 , p. 72) . 
These events shifted Hungary ' s policy attention . Unexpected events also affect a 
Presidency ' s capacity to lead decision-making . Even when preparations are strong , 
domestic political turmoil can derail the Presidency ' s work, such as during the 2009 
Czech Presidency. 
Another limitation is that no Presidency tenn is independent of others , especially 
now that the trio format exists . Trio members coordinate preparation and priorities to an 
extent. The Spain , Belgiwn , Hungary trio "jointly developed a common Presidency 
programme , painstakingly prepared in the national capitals " and sent delegations of 
liaisons to each capital to enhance cooperation (Batory & Puetter , 2012 , p. 102). Even 
before the trio set-up , however , Presidencies inherited part of their agendas from the 
prior Presidency (Manners , 2003). At the very least, they started from where the last 
Presidency finished- in that legislation would still be in processing at various stages-
and the new Presidency must decide how to approach the legislation. EU Council 
Presidencies are individual and distinct , but interconnected. 
Timing. Studies have found that the timing of the policy process is a factor in a 
Presidency ' s ability to influence policy outcomes. Specifically , Thomson (2008a) does 
not view the Presidenc y as having great influence to shape the outcome of legislation 
that is initiated or f orming during its Presidency tenn , but asserts that Presidencies have 
the capability to influence legislation that is beingf inali:::ed under the Presidency. 
Schalk et al. (2007) and Warntjen (2008b) also find that the finalizing Presidency holds 
the most influence over the content of decision outcomes . This finding is significant 
because as one looks at a Presidency ' s priorities and plans for its term , it may be that 
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the legislation already in processing is where the Presidency will have the greatest 
effect. 
Explaining Variation 
Many different factors explain variation in the performance of Presidencies . 
Some are domestic, like the composition of the government (i.e. the political orientation 
and the stability of the coalition), while others are external , such as international 
conflict or crises. Not all factors described below affect each Presidency , but they are 
important to consider when analyzing outcomes and comparing cases. The presence of 
international conflict or crises can derail work on certain issues if the EU and the 
Presidency's attention is suddenly directed elsewhere. A change in political leadership 
or the governing coalition will also affect the Presidency's ability to function effectively 
as new ministers and officials may become in charge of leading the Council. 
Characteristics of the domestic political landscape - including party orientation, 
and leanings of parties and leadership toward issues such as EU membership and 
integration - affect a Presidency ' s preparation as well as its behavior and opportunities 
while holding the position . For example , when the 2009 Czech Presidency took office 
there were concerns over the country ' s euroskeptic President and the unstable 
governing coalition (Kral , Bartovic , and Rihackova , 2009 ; Kral, 2008). Domestic 
politics can shape the Presidency by "facilitating or rendering more difficult certain 
courses of action " (Elgstrom & Tallberg , 2003 , p. 194). These courses of action could 
be more difficult because something that may be popular and beneficial for the 
Presidency at the EU-level may be opposed at the national political level (E lgstrom & 
Tallberg , 2003) . As Johansson , Langdal and von Sydow (2012) point out , if two 
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opposing groups had fought against each other recently in elections , and then 
cooperated in regards to the Presidency , they "would risk alienating party members and 
voters at large" (p. 222) . Upheaval from even purely domestic problems can challenge 
the Presidency ' s ability to work effectively and efficiently . 
Along the same lines, the composition of the government can also affect how a 
Presidency performs . According to Elgstrom, "Countries with unstable coalition 
governments or fragile government majorities are hypothesized to defend self-interests 
stubbornly in order to remain in power , and to prioritize issues that are sensitive to 
domestic constituencies " (2003 , p. 9). While managing the presidency , at the same time 
the govermnent must "avoid decisions and compromises that can be exploited by its 
national party competitors " (Elgstrom & Tallberg, 2003 , p. 195). The danger of such 
compromises can limit progress under a Presidency with an unstable government. A 
Presidency with a stable government is likely to be more effective and make a better 
mediator than one with an unstable government that is likely to focus more on its own 
interests and domestic politics than brokering consensus within the Council. Coalition 
problems can also affect the vital preparation period for Presidencies. For example , 
because of support and consensus issues in the Dutch government coa1ition, "it became 
increasingly difficult for the Dutch government to present a clear and ambitious 
programme for its EU Presidency ... [ which] may have hampered domestic co-ordination 
processes " (Van Keulen & Rood 2003 , p. 85). 
Upcoming elections are another factor that can affect cooperation within a state , 
and thus affect the Presidency ' s performance . 1f a governing party is concerned about 
the possibility of not being elected , it may be more attuned to the interests of its 
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population than acting as a leader and negotiator within the EU (Elgstrom , 2003 , p. 9). 
Costa , Couvidat and Daloz (2003) add that concerns over re-election " inevitably result 
in a certain timidity " (p. 128). A choice of the German government is evidence of the 
concerns that countries hold over upcoming elections : although scheduled to hold the 
Presidency in the second half of 2006 , Germany switched with Finland through a 2002 
Council Decision because federal elections were scheduled for the same time (Vestring , 
2002 ; Lesen , 2005). In the case of the 2000 France Presidency , the "EU consequently 
became a ground for confrontation " between Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin, who 
were both expected to run for President in 2002 (Costa et al., 2003 , pp . 128-9). This 
competition between the two "sometimes placed obstacles in the way of solutions to 
problems ," and "Jacques Chirac attempted to claim credit for some of the French 
initiatives [ of the Presidency]. .. which were clearly out of his domaine reserve" (Costa 
et al. , 2003 , p. 129). Upcoming elections will generally have a negative or neutral effect 
on the Presidency ' s work. At 6mes an election could be a catalyst for cooperation , but it 
seems that most Presidency countries are wary of holding elections near to the 
Presidency period and of the effect it may have on the Presidency ' s work. 
The presence of strong leadership and a robust civil service are other factors 
within a state that affect its Presidency (Van Keulen & Rood , 2003; Costa et al., 2003). 
Civil servants are important in terms of cooperation with other Presidencies : in the case 
of the Spain - Belgium - Hungary trio , civil servants in each country developed links 
with other civil servants tasked with the same topic , and experienced enhanced 
coordination (Batory & Puetter , 2012 , p. 104). Large member states often have an 
advantage in terms of a robust civil service because managing the Presidency is so 
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taxing for small countries and their staff. Preparation for the Presidency requires 
extensive training of the top civil servant professionals (Udovic & Svethcic , 2012 , p. 
11 ). In the case of Slovenia , those designated to be liaison official s and those that would 
be chairing positions on c01mnittees worked in Brussels for at least a year or two before 
the beginning of the Presidency term (Udovic & Svetlicic , 2012 , p. 11). Udovic & 
Svetlicic see this as beneficial because the officials were then more familiar with the 
bureaucracy and processes , and therefore "better prepared to debate , negotiate and 
mitigate between various interests at the EU level" (2012 , p. 11 ). Having a small body 
of civil servants with little training can be detrimental to the mission of the Presidency 
if they lack understanding and cannot successfully maneuver the EU decision-making 
process . 
Many exogenous factors can affect a Presidency ' s ability to lead EU decision-
making. These include international conflicts and crises , natural disasters and more. The 
state of EU internal affairs and inter-institutional relations are other additional factors 
(Bunse , 2009 , p.5). For example , as inter-institutional relations change , like they did 
with the Treaty of Lisbon , the various institutions must readjust and figure out what the 
new relation ships will look like . The relations can be unsteady at first. ln terms of 
internal affairs , the general status of support for integration plays a role in how much a 
Pre sidency and the EU in general can accomplish. Resources allocated for the 
Presidency , support for EU integration and past Presidency experience are additional 
factors (Bunse , 2009 ; Bukowski , 2009 ; Costa et al., 2003). 
In regards to economic policy , the fact that not all EU member states are 
members of the euro zone can influence discussion and hinder a non-euro zone 
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Presidency (Pomorska & Vanhoonacker , 2012) . In the case of Poland , the 2011 
Presidency was "handicapped " and there were "clear limits to the scope of action by the 
Polish chair ," according to Pomorska and Vanhoonacker (2012 , pp. 77-78). German 
Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy took charge instead , and Poland had 
more of a coordinating role (Pomorska & Vanhoonacker , 2012 , p. 82). The 2012 Danish 
Presidency faced similar problems . Euro zone issues were "out of its reach ," and 
Manners (2013) feels more could have been accomplished by the Presidency had it been 
a eurozone member (p . 71). The fact that none of the three countries in the trio Poland -
Derunark - Cyprus were members of the euro zone may have been a factor that 
hindered the Presidencies ' capabilities to act on euro-related economic topics . 
Approaches to Understanding the Presidency 
Scholars draw upon two competing variations of institutionalism to explain 
actions of the Presidency. Both are convincing, but they emphasize different factors . In 
explaining the behavior of Presidencies , rational choice institutionalists emphasize a 
member state ' s national interests , whereas sociological institutionalists emphasize 
norms and expectations of the Presidency as explanation for its behavior. It is difficult 
to state which approach better fits Presidency analysis because it can be hard to 
distinguish what behavior based on national interests looks like versus what behavior 
based on norms and expectations looks like . Both approaches provide insight and a 
deeper understanding to the Presidency institution . 
Rational choice institutionalism. Self-interest and cost-benefit analysis are two 
features that rational choice institutionalists highlight when analyzing the Presidency 
and Council decision-making (Verhoeff & Niemann , 2011 ; Elgstrom & Tallberg , 2003 ). 
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A rational choice institutionalist approach perceives the Presidency to be a strategic 
actor that operates within the norms of the position to further national interests 
(Elgstrom, 2003) . This approach explains the Presidency ' s ability to influence .Council 
decision-making because it emphasizes the institutions that "provide the presidency 
with asymmetric access to infonnation and asymmetric control over the negotiation 
procedure vis-a-vis other member states" (Schalk et al., 2007 , pp. 230-231) . The 
Council Secretariat - an aid to the Presidency in terms of navigating bureaucracy and 
forming consensus - is one example of an institution that provides these benefits . Utility 
maximization of resources available to the Presidency is another important part of this 
approach. A Presidency works to maximize its national interest, but as noted before , this 
can vary between domestic interest on certain policies and broader national interest to 
gain a stronger reputation within the EU decision-making realm . Norms like neutrality 
are not obeyed simply for the sake of being norms, but instead are "enacted as a result 
of cost-benefit calculations because non-compliance could compromise one ' s reputation 
or provoke non-co-operation from other governments " (Elgstrom and Tallberg , 2003, as 
cited in Verhoeff and Niemann , 2011, 1276). While many factors , such as the domestic 
and EU political situations , external crises and more, affect how a Presidency acts, the 
rational choice institutionalist approach emphasizes utility-maximization and national 
interest. Such an approach does explain the decision-making behavior of Presidencies. 
Sociological institutionalism. The sociological institutionalist approach , on the 
other hand, emphasizes national identity , norms , expectations and perceptions over 
national interests (Elgstrom , 2003 ; Verhoeff & Niemann , 2011 ; Bunse, 2009) . The 
approach "emphasize[ s] the relevance of internalization of the impartiality norm and the 
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obligation to fulfil core leadership functions to the benefit of the Union " (Batory and 
Puetter , 2013 , p. 100). Under sociological institutionalism , informal practices and 
power relations are significant (Jenson & Merand , 2010 , p. 74 ). Included in these 
informal practices is the norm of neutrality , which according to thjs approach weighs 
more heavily on a Presidency than specific national policy interests. Expectations of 
Presidencies also influence behavior. As Verhoeff and Niemann describe , "The 
behaviour of actors is determined by what they think is expected from them , or by what 
they themselves believe is appropriate , rather than cost-benefit calculations " (2011 , p. 
1276). Van Keulen and Rood (2003) point to the 1997 Dutch Presidency as an example. 
They argue that the political landscape affected how the Dutch perceived their 
Presidency potential , and in turn their behavior. This landscape included the 
Conservative UK goverrunent , which the Dutch viewed as a block to EU treaty reforms 
(Van Keulen & Rood , 2003 , pp. 82-85) . This perceived limitation changed how they 
understood their potential and in turn how they approached the Presidency , which 
centered around being a neutral broker rather than trying to push certain solutions (Van 
Keulen & Rood , 2003 , p. 82). 
Conclusion 
The EU Council Presidency is an important but often overlooked part of the EU 
decision-making body . The 2009 Lisbon Treaty reduced the role of the Presidency -
which no longer chairs the European Council and has less involvement in foreign 
polic y- but it remains an important position to observe and analyze because it is a 
major player in the EU legislative process (Drieskens , 201 l , p. 100). Member states 
holding the position face a dilemma between addressing national interests and acting 
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within the norm ofneutrahty. It is a complex institution , but also a significant 
opportunity to affect EU policy and decision-making , an opportunity that small states 
especially value and defend . 
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Chapter 3: Small State Presidencies 
The EU Council Presidency is a note-worthy and understudied topic , and even 
less analyzed is the role of small states in the Presidency . Small state Presidencies 
usually have more to gain from a successful Presidency . A better reputation can foster 
negotiation and cooperation with other member states after the Presidency period. 
Although debatable , small state Presidencies are perceived by some scholars as 
advantaged in that the have fewer decisive self-interests and may find the diplomatic , 
neutral role of the Presidency easier (Elgstrom , 2003 , p. 9) . On the other hand , they 
often have fewer resources in terms of funding and staff , which can make running the 
Presidency a more difficult task. Small states are some of the staunchest defenders of 
the Presidency position because it provides an opportunity to influence the agenda , 
improve relationships with other member states and build credibility. Although the 
Presidency no longer leads the European Council , the opportunity to lead the Council of 
Ministers for six months once every several years is important , viewed as a 
counterweight to the power of some of the larger EU member states (Bunse, 2009 , p. 
61). 
I chose three small state Presidencies to examine more closely: Slovenia (2008 ), 
the Czech Republic (2009) and Sweden (2009) . These cases cover diversity in region 
and length of EU membership , and provide infonnation on their priorities and 
achievements available on Presidency or government websites. There are many ways to 
evaluate Presidencies , depending on what one considers their primary role. I present an 
evaluation of the cases based on their relative success in advancing stated priorities 
from the countries ' work programs and compare the results to factors that affect a 
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Presidency ' s operation. In evaluating the advancement of priorities , [ designate progress 
on each priority as limited , moderate or substantial. The total scores for each Presidency 
are then compared to a number of factors that affect how Presidencies operate , such as 
support for EU integration and upcoming elections. Finally , I test for correlation 
between the different factors and review the results. 
Qualities of Small State Presidencies 
Advantages of small state Presidencies include being more effective brokers 
because they "are believed to have fewer decisive self-interests to defend " (Elgstrom , 
2003 , p. 9). They are also seen as less prone to partiality than large states . According to 
an EU official Elgstrom interviewed , " the great power instinct is hard to get away from " 
and this is why Elgstrom views large powers as "more prone to intervene actively in 
favour of their own interests " (2003 , p. 49) . Another hypothesis for why they could be 
less prone to partiality is that they have more to gain or lose from holding the 
Presidency , in terms of reputation and credibility. 
Another advantage of small states is that the smaller administrations of a small 
state Presidency are "Easier to coordinate than the big state ' s bureaucratic contacts " 
(2003 , p. 9). Because small states' civil services tend to be more compact than large 
bureaucracies , these states are more likely to work closely with officials in the 
Commission , the European Parliament , and most of all, the Council Secretariat - a great 
resource of information on topics of the Presidency and Council (Quaglia & Moxon-
Browne , 2006 , pp. 353 , 362). 
Bunse (2009) agrees that states "have strong incentives to overcome their lack of 
resources through extensive use of Council assets , close collaboration with the 
37 
Commission, intensive preparation and efficient. .. coordination " (pp. 72-73). Some of 
the perceived disadvantages of small states can be overcome through such preparation 
and coordination . Such preparation may include administration and officials becoming 
familiar with Brussels and the process. As mentioned above, countries like Slovenia 
send their personnel to Brussels one or two years before the Presidency term starts in 
order to gain knowledge of the decision-making process and bureaucracy (Udovic & 
Svetlicic , 2012 , p. 11). Operating the Presidency also requires a large nwnber of civil 
service personnel. Small states holding the Presidency likely need to train those serving 
the Presidency but also require additional civil servants to fill in at home while others 
are focused on the Presidency . Other preparation will include creating a work program 
of priorities , coordinating these priorities with the other members of the trio, and 
adjusting as needed based on changing EU and international situations . 
According to Bukowski (2009) , the responsibilities of the EU Presidency can be 
taxing on the resources - especially foreign policy resources- of smaller countries (p. 
97) . Small states appear to be less able to handle the burden than large states 
(Tiilikainen , 2003). A small state faces more pressure reputation-wise because there is 
more to gain or lose, according to Bukowski . Another disadvantage is that small states 
hold less "political clout and bargaining power , particularly needed in foreign affairs to 
solve major deadlocks " (Bunse , 2009 , p. 63). Small size, fairly or not, is associated with 
many disadvantages and a perceived lack of power in EU diplomacy , both in general 
and specifically in relation to the Presidency . 
Small member states value the institution of the Presidency because it helps 
equalize power differences (Bunse , 2009 , p. 61). Rather than the "muscle" of some 
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large countries , small state diplomacy is perceived to be "the seeking of consensus , 
exploring possibilities for trade-offs and coalition-building " (Quagha & Moxon-
Browne , 2006, p. 362). Presidencies do not appear disadvantaged in terms of proposing 
and advancing policy : Bunse (2009) finds no evidence of a significant difference in 
terms the amount of legislation adopted under small and large presidencies . 6 While they 
face certain challenges , like that of resources , small state Presidencies can be very 
successful. 
Who are the small states? There is no single accepted definition that 
categorizes small and large EU member states, but many of them overlap and define 
similar groups. For example , Bunse (2009) defines small states as those with 
significantly fewer than 40 million inhabitants (p. 11 ). This definition includes 22 out of 
28 current EU member states .7 Panke (2010) , on the other hand, defines small states as 
those that have less than the average number of votes in the Council of the Ministers. At 
the time of writing her article , 19 out of the 27 EU member states were considered small 
states. After Croatia ' s accession , 20 out of 28 member states fall below the average 
number of votes in the Council. The Czech Republic , Sweden and Slovenia all fit under 
both definitions of small states . 
Reasoning for case selection. First and foremost , when organizing this paper , I 
wanted to study small member states. While some scholars , such as Bunse (2009) , have 
analyzed small states, they are relatively under-explored in general Presidency 
6 Bunse examined the number of Directives , Re gulation s, Decisions , Recommendation s, Common 
Strate gy /Joint Actions and other leg islation that wa s adopt ed under each Pre sidenc y from 1999 throu gh 
200 7. Upon comparin g the averages of small and large state outputs , the numbers do not appear 
significantl y different and accordin g to Bun se, small stat es "g enerate s imilar leve ls of leg is la tive output 
durin g their pre sidencie s to big state s" (pp . 206, 2 19-22 1 ). Bun se examined the total number of 
leg islative output , but did not addr ess the significanc e of the leg islation , which ma y be a fact or to 
con s ider in comparin g legislati ve output. 
7 Under thi s definition , the large states include France , German y, Ital y, th e UK , Spain and Pol and . 
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literature. Many scholars , including Bunse , have examined Presidencies from the late 
1990s or early 2000s. Instead , I wanted to study more recent cases because the 
European Union is a constantly-evolving body , and examining these cases may be more 
relevant. The case studies detaded in Bunse and Elgstrom ' s books took place before the 
2004 addition of ten new member states and the implementation of the Treaty of Nice . 
Although the Treaty of Nice did not specifically target the Council Presidency , it did 
alter voting weights in the Council and decision -making in the Union. While choosing 
more recent cases resulted in fewer books covering the cases , and sometimes less 
literature overall , one additional resource was the websites maintained by each member 
state . The Czech and Slovenian Presidency websites are still running, which adds to the 
availability of sources on priorities and achievements . While the Swedish Presidency 
website is no longer running , many of the same resources are available from other 
Swedish government websites . 
Small states typically have fewer resources , or at least smaller institutions and 
bureaucracies to accommodate the Presidency tasks , including running thousands of 
meetings . The limited civil service size of small states encourages closer collaboration 
with the Council Secretariat, which is a tremendous resource of bureaucratic , technical 
and legal knowledge (Quaglia & Moxon-Browne , 2006; Nedergaard , 2007). Large 
states tend not to take advantage of this resource as much as small states , according to 
Bunse (2009), because they have greater resources available and less prestige to gain 
from the Presidency (p. 156). 
In these three cases , one finds diversity both in region and length of EU 
membership. As a Scandinavian country , Sweden was interested in pursuing greater 
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attention on the Baltic region . Slovenia is located in southern central Europe and was 
focused regionally on the Western Balkans because of its links to the area. The Czech 
Republic is also part of central Europe , but has a different regional focus and qualities 
than Slovenia . While Sweden acceded to the EU in 1995, the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia both became members in 2004 . Two of these cases- the Czech Republic and 
Sweden- fall under the same trio with France . By selecting two Presidencies from the 
same trio , I remove trio membership as a source of variation . 
In comparing Presidencies , it was also important to choose three cases that all 
generally fell under the same Treaty and number of member states (Manners , 2013, p. 
70). Because the role of the Presidency has changed significantly under the Lisbon 
Treaty , I chose Presidencies that operated for the most under the same set of rules. All 
three Presidencies took office under the Treaty of Nice , before the Lisbon Treaty 
entered into force. Although the Lisbon Treaty was adopted on 1 December 2009, 
toward the end of the Swedish Presidency , it did not greatly alter the Swedish 
Presidenc y' s operation as a whole . 
The Cases of Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Sweden 
In this paper , I examine three cases- the EU Council Presidencies of Slovenia , 
the Czech Republic and Sweden- and evaluate them on the basis of the priorities set 
out in each country 's work program. Slovenia held the Presidency for the first half of 
2008 , the Czech Republic for the first half of 2009 and Sweden followed with the 
second half of 2009 . Presidencies lay out priorities in their work program that reveal 
what their plans are and what they want to accomplish during their terms . I find these 
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priorities a rational basis for evaluation because they detail what the Presidency state 
itself plans to accomplish during its six-month term . 
Slovenia. When Slovenia took the Presidency , it had only been an EU member 
state for four years . Slovenia followed Germany and Portugal as the final member of the 
first trio Presidency group . As the first 2004 accession state to hold the Presidency 
position , expectations of its performance were rather low both throughout Europe and 
domestically in Slovenia (Bukowski , 2009 , p. 101). It did request and receive assistance 
from its trio partners as well as other EU member states . As Slovenia had only a small 
number of embassies abroad , it formed an agreement with France to allow use of their 
embassies "for activities associated with the representation of EU interests abroad " 
during the Presidency tenn (Bukowski , 2009 , p. 101). The recognition and attempt to 
compensate for such weaknesses was a positive sign of the preparation and thought that 
was put into the Slovenian Presidency . 
The Presidency provided an opportunity for the state to prove its management 
and diplomatic ability. Slovenia had past leadership experience chairing the UN 
Security Council in 1998/99 and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe in 2005 , but this was the country ' s first encounter with leading the EU . 
Preparations for the Presidenc y began in 2005 , and according to Kanjc (2009b ), 
Slovenia "prepared well " (p. 90). 1n October 2005 , Slovenia adopted a staffing plan that 
increased the country ' s permanent representation in Brussels and hired additional 
government employees to help with the Presidency (Bukowski , 2009 , 100) . Slovenia 
took a cautious approach to the Presidency , according to Fink-Hafner and Lajh (2008 ), 
prioritizing "playing it safe " over than a more ambitious agenda of priorities (p. 6). It 
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seemed aware of its limitations in forming priorities. Due to the limited expectations of 
other member states , "anything Slovenia did accomplish would count as a benefit " 
(Bukowski , 2009 , p. 114) . Bukowski points to the small size of the Slovenian 
"bureaucratic resources and diplomatic presence " as the reason for the Presidency ' s 
limited scope , but being a fairly new member of the EU also probably contributed to 
this small diplomatic presence . 
The Presidency received overall positive reactions from EU observers and 
diplomats in Brussels , although Bukowski (2009) attributes some of that to the very low 
expectations of its perfonnance (pp . 108, 110-111 ). One issue the Slovenian Presidency 
encountered was a lack of human resources , both in quantity and quality (Kanjc and 
Svetlicic , 2010 , p. 98). In terms of quality , the depth of knowledge on fields relating to 
the Presidency and the EU was not strong enough . In the survey Kanjc and Svetlicic 
carried out, Slovenian civil servant respondents also highlighted weak inter- and intra-
ministerial cooperation as a problem that plagued the Presidency (20 l 0, p. 98) . Overall , 
the Slovenian Presidency enhanced the country ' s reputation within the EU (Bukowski, 
2009 , p. 111), but there are areas from which the Presidency can learn and improve on 
in the future - such as expanding its civil service and improving intra-ministerial 
cooperation. 
Czech Republic. The Czech Republic was also a newer member of the EU 
when it assumed the Presidency , but the prospect of its tenn was met with more 
hesitation than the Slovenian Presidency because of the Czech President Vaclav Klaus , 
a vocal euroskeptic . The Czech Republic began preparations in 2005 but did not take 
them seriously until 2007 , according to Pehe (2008). The Czech work program assumed 
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a moderate approach , meaning that it was not extremely specific. It focused on practical 
policy initiatives on topics such as energy security (Slosarcik, 2011, p. 28). This 
approach may be a reflection of the state acknowledging its lack of experience and low 
expectations . In March 2009, in the middle of its Presidency term, Czech Prime 
Minister Mirek Topolanek ' s government lost a vote of no confidence. The opposition 
was aided by President Klaus and '' sacrificed the credibility and reputation of the Czech 
Republic in the EU for short-term, domestic political gain" (Kral et al., 2009 , p. 29). A 
caretaker government was not installed until one and a half months after the vote of no 
confidence (Kaczynski, 2009a) . According to Kral et al, the move against Topolanek ' s 
government "was probably largely inspired by the President's intention to prevent the 
Lisbon Treaty from being ratified ," as the Czech Senate was expected to vote on the 
issue in May (2009, p. 22) . Mid-way through the Czech Presidency term, the downfall 
of the government was expected to delay items like forming a common EU position 
ahead of the Copenhagen Conference (Kral, et al, p. 22) . It is difficult to attribute any 
specific delay or failure to pass legislation to the fall of Topolanek ' s government, but 
the connection is conceivable . The domestic conflict "significantly weakened the 
performance of the Czech executive during the second half of the Presidency" 
(Slosarcik, 2011 , p. 9), 
The political disaster during the Presidency damaged the Czech Republic ' s 
reputation and was a source of bad press : a headline of an EUobserver article read , 
"Czech presidency limps off EU stage" (Rettman, 30 June 2009) . A Brussels-based 
ambassador explained , "Their officials were very good. Their politicians catastrophic " 
(Barber, 2009) . Reactions were not entirely bad, as the Czech Presidency did manage to 
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accomplish some of its priorities and performed well as an impartial mediator during 
the Russia-Ukraine gas conflict (Kral , Bartovic , & Rihackova , 2009). The memory of 
the collapse of government left a mark , however. Even prior to the 2009 Presidency , 
Pehe (2008) perceived the Czech Republic as an impediment to EU integration , "a 
country that needlessly throws sand into the works of European integration ," (Pehe , 
2008, p. 17), and its 2009 Presidency term did not better its reputation. 
Sweden. Preparations for the Swedish Presidency began soon after Prime 
Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt took office in 2006 (Miles , 2010) . Nearly 200 additional 
personnel were hired in support of the Presidency (Swedish Presidency of the European 
Union, 2010). One of the state ' s primary goals and accomplishments was not one of the 
five priorities listed in its work program , but instead the finalization of the Lisbon 
Treaty (Miles , 2010) . The Treaty had been delayed due to opposition from a few 
countries, but its ratification was secured under the Swedish Presidency. Some scholars 
critique the lack of continuity between the France - Czech Republic - Sweden trio, 
although the Czech government collapse is a factor that contributed to the issue 
(Kaczynski , 2009b ; Fabry , 2009) . Although strong disapproval was expressed over the 
lack of international agreement on environmental issues at the Copenhagen , the 
Swedish Presidency is viewed as fairly successful overall. 
Evaluation Based on Priority Advancement 
One approach to evaluating a Presidency is based on how well a member state 
leads the EU while holding the position. Because this concept is very broad and 
therefore resists measurement , a more specific focus can be set on the Presidency ' s 
ability to advance the priorities it set out for its term . The Presidency guides the agenda 
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of the EU, but rather than influencing policy specifically toward its interests , it may 
instead focus on forming general cooperation and progress on the topic . 
As Langdal (2010) notes, one drawback with reviewing a Presidency ' s 
perfonnance based on the priorities they set is that "other actors will have a different set 
of expectations , which could constitute as an equally valid basis for structuring an 
account. .. but with a different content and possibly different conclusions " (p. 2). This is 
a good point but would complicate analysis because in choosing a different set of 
expectations , one would ignore yet other valid bases for evaluation. For the sake of this 
paper ' s analysis, a Presidency ' s priorities provide the clearest readings of its 
expectations and goals. 
Priorities are typically outlined by Presidencies in work programs , as well as in 
reports and speeches. All work programs are not created equally , but that is part of the 
benefit of thjs fonn of evaluation . Presidencies do come from different backgrounds , 
levels of experience and have diverse expectations about what they can accomplish. 
Some appear to be more realistic in forming priorities than others. 
One issue that Van Keulen and Rood (2003) point to is that it can be hard to 
distinguish between what was accomplished during preparation versus the actual 
Presidency period because some dossiers have been "thoroughly prepared ahead of 
time " (p. 79) . On the other hand , preparation is part of what makes Presidencies 
successful and one should not fault or discount a state for making preparations ahead of 
time. Careful preparation of the agenda and staff likely is a factor that leads to a more 
successful Presidency. Another difficulty in evaluating Presidencies is that it "is nearly 
impossible to discern what specific result can be attributed to a country ' s Presidency " as 
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opposed to other factors (Van Keulen & Rood , 2003 , p. 79). This , unfortunately , is 
something that is difficult to control for. All Presidencies take place in different 
environments . 
The method of evaluating priority advancement is certainly subjective , but can 
still be useful in studying and comparing Presidencies . The sources from which 
information is drawn are likely to be biased in one way or another , which is why I drew 
from a variety of sources and viewpoints covering the Presidency ' s preparations and its 
outcome. Priorities set out in Presidency work programs , elaborated in speeches and 
other reports are the basis of evaluation for the three cases. I describe the priorities and 
make an assessment on how well the Presidencies advanced their goals . Brattberg , 
Rhinard and Kajnc (2011) point out that "any country will be prone to report that it 
achieved its objectives ," or may exaggerate the extent to which it achieved them (p. 19). 
Reliance on that a broad range of sources including journal articles , newspapers and 
government reports helps to compensate for some of the self-promotion naturally 
present in achievement reports. 
Work programs help deliver a clear message about what the Presidency intends 
to accomplish during its term . While some programs may be more limited or vague than 
others that are detailed and specific , the broad programs are no less valid . Specificity or 
lack thereof may reflect the Presidency taking into account its capabilities , and trying to 
be realistic about what it can and cannot accomplish in the six-month term. While some 
err on the pragmatic side , others attempt too much , like the 1998 Brjtish Presidency that 
set sixty-three goals and six major themes (Manners , 2003 , p. 98).8 A Presidency ' s 
8 I searched for how man y of the sixty-thre e goals the Briti sh Pre sidency fulfilled , but Mann ers 
(2003) does not cover it and did not find the information els ewh ere. 
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priorities guide its preparation and work during the Presidenc y period, and provide a 
strong basis from which to evaluate the cases . 
Scale. Each priority is judged separately on a scale of 0, l or 2. Such evaluation 
is subjective , but I attempt to make clear the reasoning behind each rating in hopes that 
others can understand and may concur. On this scale , 0 signifies limited advancement of 
priorities , 1 equals moderate progress and 2 indicates substantial progress . Zero does 
not signify that no progress occurred and two does not stand for complete achievement 
of priorities because every Presidency makes at least some advancement of a priority , 
and no Presidency advances a priority perfectly . Every priority would be rated at a l 
and the other two measures would be useless . So instead , in order to diversify the 
rankings given to the Presidencies , limited , moderate and substantial ranks of progress 
are used. 
Because the Czech Presidency ' s work program contains only three major 
priorities , unlike the five that Slovenia and Sweden produced , I weight its perfonnance 
in the three categories to match the 10 possible points that the Slovenian and Swedish 
performance can achieve . There were six possible points from the 3 Czech priorities . 
The six points were multiplied by five-thirds to reach a total of 10 possible points , and 
therefore the weighted Czech score is 6 points (3 points multiplied by 5/3). 
Priorities of the Presidencies 
Before each Presidency began , the government put together a list of priorities 
published in their work programs and emphasized elsewhere , such as in speeches made 
by the country ' s leaders. I explore each priority , the country ' s progress on the topic , and 
make an assessment on what score the priority receives . 
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Slovenia. Slovenia ' s work program consists of five priorities , spanning from 
Lisbon Treaty finalization to enhancing intercultural dialogue. According to Bukowski 
(2009) , Slovenia "made a realistic assessment of its capabilities " in fonning its work 
program and planning for the six-month term (p . 114 ). The Slovenian Presidency seems 
to have taken a pragmatic approach , in that did not attempt to stretch its abilities too far. 
The work program also included areas of focus that were not in the five main priorities , 
such as goals related to justice and home affairs. Those topics are not used to evaluate 
the Presidency , but the Presidency's accomplishments on such issues contribute to its 
overall reception by EU observers and officials . 
Slovenian Priorities 
• The future of the Union and timely entry into force of Lisbon Treaty 
• Successful launching of the new Lisbon Strategy cycle 
• A step forward in addressing climate-energy issues 
• Strengthening the European Perspective of the Western Balkans 
• Promoting the dialogue between cultures , beliefs and traditions, in the 
context of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 
Future of the Union and the Lisbon Treaty. The top priority of the Slovenian 
Presidency was a "successful conclusion of the ratification procedures " of the Lisbon 
Treaty , according to their Presidency program (Slovenian Presidency of the European 
Union , 2007 , p . 5). Their hope , in pushing for the completion of the ratification process , 
was that the treaty would be adopted before the 2009 European Parliament elections . 
Related to the future of the European Union aspect of the priority , the Slovenian 
Presidency also set the goal of continuing work toward enlargement , especially for 
Croatia and Turkey. 
By the end of the Slovenian Presidency , 19 member states had ratified the 
Lisbon Treaty . Slovenia was the second member state , following Hungary , to ratify the 
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treaty on January 29, 2008 . Ireland rejected ratification in June, and several other states 
had yet to sign by July 2008 , the end of the Presidency tenn. Slovenia began technical 
preparations for the Treaty ' s implementation , but overall ratification was not achieved 
(Slovenian Presidency of the European Union , 2008) . Limited progress was made in 
terms of accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey . 
Although Ireland ' s rejection of the Lisbon Treaty was not a fault of the 
Slovenian Presidency , it was still one of the factors that blocked major progress on the 
Treaty ' s acceptance. Overall , progress on the priority regarding the Union and the 
Lisbon Treaty was limited. The assessment of this priority is a 0. 
Lisbon Strategy cycle. The Slovenian Presidency also focused on continuing the 
second three-year cycle of the Lisbon Treaty , under which work areas include 
strengthening competitive business and developing human capital. The Slovenian 
Presidency planned the addition of implementation of reform programs to this agenda 
(Slovenian Presidency of the European Union , 2007) . Better investment in research and 
development was another key goal under this priority (Fink-Hafner and Lajh, 2008) . 
The Slovenian Presidency also planned on addressing social issues , sustainability and 
integrating the internal market (Slovenian Presidency of the European Union , 2007). 
One adjustment the Slovenian Presidency made to the Lisbon Strategy cycle was 
the introduction of a "fifth freedom ," the free flow of information (Slovenian 
Presidency of the European Union , 2008). The Presidency report notes the agreement 
that the Lisbon Strategy process should continue after 2010 as one example of success . 
It also made progress on the social dimension of the Strategy : the Council formed 
agreement on directives regarding working conditions for temporary workers and 
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working hours (Slovenian Presidency of the European Union , 2008 , p. 5). Lastly , 
discussion chaired by the Presidency led to the adoption of the Small Business Act 
(Fink-Hafner and Lajh , 2008 , p. 48) . 
While this priority was less ambitious than the Lisbon Treaty priority , it was 
more pragmatic and the Slovenian Presidency made substantial progress on the topic. 
The evidence supports Bukowski ' s statement, "the outcome conformed to one of 
Slovenia ' s stated objectives for its presidency term" (2009 , p. 104 ). The assessment of 
this priority is a 2. 
Climate-Energy issues. Another priority of the Slovenian Presidency work 
program was to further progress on the climate legislative package to form EU-wide 
agreement before the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009. The Slovenian 
Presidency was specifically trying to reach "political agreement concerning the third 
internal market package for energy " (Slovenian Presidency Progra1nme website , n.d.). 
In addition to preparations for Copenhagen , the Presidency work program explains that 
it "will seek to reach an agreement on the further liberalization of the internal market 
for gas and electricity " for the purpose of improving competitiveness and securing the 
energy supply (Slovenian Presidency of the European Union , 2007). 
The outcome of the climate-energy issues priority is mixed . The Slovenian 
Presidency was rather neutral on the climate and energy package , according to Kanjc 
(2009b ), and was therefore a "credible mediator ," which helped create an open debate 
between EU leaders (p. 91) . The Presidency successfully coordinated and represented 
an EU mandate on biodiversity preservation at a conference and meeting of parties 
(Slovenian Presidency of the European Union , 2008) . Three Directives and one 
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Regulation on enviromnental protection were approved in the European Parliament 
during the Slovenian Presidency , according to the Presidency 's achievements website 
(2008). On the other hand , some were critical of certain targets and proposals related to 
climate and energy issues : the Environmental Bureau said that the package "lacks teeth" 
(Fink-Hafner and Lajh, 2008, p. 50). 
Overall, the Slovenian Presidency made substantial progress in advancing the 
climate-energy priority, but it is important to note that there were areas that received 
criticism , such as proposals on bio-fuels and nuclear power which were "unconvincing 
and potentially even damaging, " (Fink-Hafner and Lajh , 2008, p. 50). Because of the 
Presidency's overall progress , however, the assessment of this priority is a 2. 
Western Balkans. Strengthening the European perspective of the Western 
Balkans was listed as the fourth priority for the Slovenian Presidency. The specific 
goals included in this regional focus were "the review of the 2003 Thessaloniki Agenda ; 
the conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement network; and the 
strengthening of regional cooperation in various areas" (Slovenian Presidency of the 
EU, 2007, p. 5). The Presidency work program emphasized the focus on and need for 
stability in the region , particularly in Kosovo . 
Because member states were to make their own decisions on relations with 
Kosovo , undergoing crisis at the time, the Slovenian Presidency faced difficulty in 
organizing response to the Western Balkans as a whole . The Presidency did, however , 
complete Stabilization and Association Agreements with all of the countries that make 
up the former Yugoslavia except Kosovo (Kanjc 2009b). The Presidency also made 
progress on modernizing research infrastructure in the Western Balkans , including 
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introducing a project to help raise money for this cause (Slovenia Presidency of the 
European Union , 2008 , p. 4) . 
Meeting the Stabilization and Association Agreement targets was important 
because these agreements would increase the level of cooperation between the EU and 
Western Balkan countries (Bukowski , 2009) . These initiatives and programs also meant 
the Western Balkans would remain part of the EU agenda in future years (Kanjc 
2009b ). The Slovenian Presidency made substantial progress in advancing the Western 
Balkans priority . The assessment of this priority is a 2. 
Promoting intercultural dialogue. 2008 was established as the European Year 
of Intercultural Dialogue , and the Slovenian Presidency therefore included the topic as 
its fifth and final priority . The Slovenian Presidency vowed to increase intercultural 
dialogue but was less specific on how it planned to accomplish goals like "coexistence 
in diversity " (Slovenian Presidency of the European Union , 2007 , p. 3). The areas the 
Presidency planned to focus on most for intercultural dialogue were the Mediterranean 
and Western Balkan countries . With that focus in mind, the Slovenian Presidency 
planned to contribute to intercultural dialogue with the founding of a Euro-
Mediterranean University in the city of Piran . 
The Slovenian Presidency term began with an international conference , 
"Intercultural Dialogue as the Fundamental Value of the EU" that was held in the 
capital Ljubljana in January (Fink-Hafner and Lajh , 2008 , p. 57). The Euro-
Mediterranean University in Piran was founded in June 2008 . According to Fink-Hafner 
and Lajh , the university is a "concrete form of intercultural dialogue " and should create 
convergence between the European , Islamic and other cultures around the 
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Mediterranean (2008 , pp. 57-58) . The Presidency also introduced initiatives on 
multilingualism and EU external relations (Slovenian Presidency of the European 
Union , 2008). 
It appears that the Slovenian Presidency made moderate progress on the 
intercultural dialogue priority. The establishment of the university in Pi ran seems to be 
a start to intercultural dialogue , but it is one of the few substantial measures that 
resulted from the Presidency . It seems unclear precisely how the Presidency promoted 
intercultural dialogue besides the university and conference it held. The assessment of 
this priority is a 1. 
Overall , the Slovenian Presidency appears to have been fairly successful. 
Although it may have been a product of initially low expectations , reactions were 
"overwhelmingly positive " (Bukowski , 2009 , p. 110). Bukowski believes that Slovenia 
"may now enjoy a more productive association within the EU and better prospects of 
achieving its foreign policy goals " as a result of a successful Presidency (2009 , p. 114 ). 
Slovenia ' s preparation for the Presidency , especially in regard to their staff at home and 
in Brussels , is likely one factor that led to its relative success . How the Slovenian 
Presidency handled the prospect of upcoming elections is also important. In order to 
quell any potential issues , the majority of parhamentary parties signed an agreement to 
not attack the government during the Presidency period (Bukowski , 2009 ). The 
outcome of this agreement was mixed , but it likely helped to make the Slovenian 
Presidency more stable and make the elections less of a threat to management during 
the Presidency tenn . The scores on the five priorities total a 7 out of I 0, achieving 
substantial progress on three of their priorities , and moderate and limited on one each . 
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Czech Republic. The EU Presidency of the Czech Republic was met with 
skepticism and low expectations (Benes & Karl as , 2010) , and was hindered by domestic 
political issues , including the collapse of Prime Minister Topolanek ' s government. 
While the work program originally consisted of five priorities , they were consolidated 
and reduced to three before the beginning of the term as the Presidency reassessed the 
EU political scene and its own abilities (Karlas , 2009 ; Kral , 2008). The Presidency took 
a moderate approach to its priorities (Slosarcik , 2011). 
Czech Republic Priorities 
• Economy 
• Energy 
• European Union in the world 
Economy. Economic issues were the top priority from the beginning of Czech 
Presidency planning (Kral et al., 2009). Enhancing transparency and stability, as well as 
developing human capital, were some of the specific goals of the Presidency (Czech 
Presidency of the European Union, 2009c ). The more general areas of focus were 
regulation , coping with decline in growth and the preparation for a united EU approach 
ahead of international conferences - specifically the April 2009 G-20 summit in London 
(Czech Presidency of the European Union , 2009c , p. 2). 
The Czech Republic claims in its post-Presidency report that the EU "made 
considerable progress in implementing the European Economic Recovery Plan .. . to 
restore economic prosperity " (Czech Presidency of the European Union , 2009a , p. iv) . 
Legislation regarding financial services was concluded , which the Presidency asserts 
will lead to better regulation of markets (Czech Presidency of the European Union , 
2009a) . According to Kral et al. , the G-20 summit "can be considered the greatest 
success of the Czech Presidency " (2009 , p. 43). A common position for the EU was 
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formed ahead of the summit. Although the position was general and not focused on 
specific figures , it included support for more regulation (Kral et al., 2009 , p. 45) . Benes 
and Karlas (2010) critique that in regards to the economic priority , the Presidency 
focused more on more short-term issues such as combating protectionism , than long-
term ones like financial regulation (Benes and Karlas , 2010 , p. 75). 
Overall, progress on the economic priority of the Czech Presidency can be 
categorized as substantial. The Presidency organized conferences on internal market 
issues and passed legislation on competitiveness and regulation. It resolved an issue on 
reduced value added taxes for local services, "a problem that had defied the best efforts 
of EU policymakers for years, " according to the Barber (2009 , p. 6). While progress 
was not perfect , it was substantial and the assessment of this priority is a 2. 
Energy. The energy priority of the Czech Presidency encompassed issues 
related to both energy and climate protection. Energy-security was a key feature of the 
priority, and the Czech Presidency planned to work on energy savings and completing 
the internal electricity and gas market (Czech Presidency of the European Union , 2009c , 
p. vii). The Presidency also planned to promote infrastructure , the creation of a common 
energy market , better coordination in foreign relations and diversification of resources 
(Czech Presidency of the European Union , 2009c , p. 7). 
The Czech Presidency succeeded in some of its goals of the energy priority , 
while failing in regards to others . One positive outcome was that the Presidency created 
a unified EU voice and carried out diplomatic work related to the Russian-Ukraine gas 
crisis during January of its term. Another positive aspect was the support of the 
development of the Southern Corridor and the Nabucco pipeline project. The Energy 
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Council also reached agreement over a directive that dictates minimum stocks of crude 
oil that must be held by member states (Czech Presidency of the European Union , 
2009a). On the other hand , progress was severely lacking in terms of climate change 
and the environment. While the work program revealed ambitious plans for climate 
change , the Presidency "left the initiative [of climate change] totally to other states ," 
according to Polish observers (Fuksiewicz & Lada , 2009 , p 13 ). The Presidency failed 
to facilitate discussion on the issue (Fuksiewicz and Lada , 2009 , p. 13). One factor may 
have been President Klaus , "who vocally questions any effort to tackle global 
environmental problems ," and therefore undermined the Czech Republic as a credible 
force in negotiations on the topic (Benes and Karlas , 2010 , p. 76). 
Progress on diversification and energy security was positive , and the Presidency 
functioned well as a mediator during the Russian gas crisis . However , progress on the 
enviromnental and climate change portions of energy priority , was poor. Therefore , 
progress on the priority in general can be categorized as moderate. The assessment of 
this priority is a 1 . 
European Union in the world This priority embraces the Presidency ' s motto , 
"Europe without Barriers ," which includes economic , cultural and value barriers , 
according to the work program (Czech Presidency of the European Union , 2009c) . The 
priority was originally entitled "E urope open and safe" and denoted that enhanced 
cooperation with EU neighbors would further the goals of Europe ' s stability and 
security (Kral , 2008, p. 45) . This priority covered many areas : further integration of the 
Western Balkans , the addition of an Eastern Partnership , an emphasis on Euro-Atlantic 
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relations , the Mediterranean , and preparation for a new plan for EU-Israel relations 
(Czech Presidency of the European Union , 2009c ). 
Under the Czech Presidency , the Eastern Partnership Project was approved and 
launched , and as mentioned under the energy priority , the Presidency ' s work in 
mediating the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis was effective (Kral et al. , 2009) . On the other 
hand , little was achieved in terrns of EU enlargement: Benes and Karlas identify work 
on accession agreements as being met with " rather limited success " (2010 , p. 78) . Kral 
et al. observe that the Presidency ' s work on the Gaza conflict "did not lead to any 
particular solution , apart from opening humanitarian corridors in the Gaza Strip " (2009 , 
p. 7). While foreign affairs is not completely in the hands of the Presidency, the 
Presidency "refused to drop its priority of upgrading EU-Israel relations, " and a 
Topolanek spokesperson made a pro-Israeli statement that "did not boost the credibility 
and neutrality of the EU mission " (Benes & Karl as, 20 l 0, p. 76) . This decision hurt the 
Presidency in regard to neutrality and external relations . 
Progress relating to the external relations priority was limited. While issues like 
the suspension of Croatia ' s accession talks were out of the hands of the Czech 
Presidency , it made limited progress and was not always effective : "the management of 
the Gaza crisis , as well as of transatlantic relations , was not free from serious lapses and 
cumbersome diplomacy " (Benes and Karlas , 2010 , p. 78) . Czech diplomacy was 
affected by the fall of the government halfway through the Presidency , and the fact that 
a caretaker government was not installed for another month and a half (Kaczynski , 
2009a). This priority was lacking and the assessment is a 0. 
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The Czech Presidency found some success but faced many struggles , in part due 
to its euroskeptic President and the collapse of Topolanek ' s government. Some of the 
Presidency ' s issues may also stem from being a newer member state and having little 
EU experience . The Czech Presidency served well as a mediator during the Russia-
Ukraine gas crisis , but performed less favorably in regard to issues like climate change . 
The scores of its priorities total 3 out of 6. Weighted to match the possible ten points of 
Sweden and Slovenia by multiplying by five-thirds , the final Czech score equals 5 out 
of 10. 
Sweden. The Swedish Presidency work program , published on its website 
shortly before the assuming the position , included five priorities over a range of issues. 
A sixth priority of sorts arose before Sweden took the Presidency - the finalization and 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty . While this was a focus and one of the great 
successes of the Swedish Presidency , I defer to the five priorities listed in the work 
program as basis for evaluation. 
Swedish Priorities 
• Economy and employment 
• Environment and climate change 
• Justice and Home Affairs 
• Baltic Sea 
• Strengthen the EU ' s role as a global actor 
Economy and employment Sweden selected the economic crisis and 
employment challenges as one of its most important priorities . The country has 
significant domestic experience in this policy area , which likely contributed to the 
planning and agenda of the priority . Goals included restoring confidence in the financial 
markets and creating long-term solutions for problems like employment and growth . 
The work program explained that a goal of the Presidency was to give "priority to 
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action regarding measures on the labour market that limit unemployment , reduce 
exclusion and return people to work " (Swedish Presidency of the European Union , 
2009, p. 4) . One of the main goals under the economic priority was to form a joint U 
position ahead of the G20 summit (Swedish Presidency of the European Union , 2009 ; 
Miles , 2010) . 
The Swedish Presidency led the Council to agree to a new structure for financial 
oversight, "aiming to create three new authorities for the supervision of financial 
services in the EU" (Miles , 2010 , p. 89) . The Presidency made general progress on its 
economic priority and coordinated agreements relating to exit strategies principles -
including structural reforms and strengthened national fiscal frameworks - and the 
banking sector (Swedish Presidency of the European Union , 2010). The Presidency 
report highlights work on a Directive on Consumers Rights as an important area of 
work related to the Internal Market (Swedish Presidency of the European Union , 2010 , 
p. 25). On the other hand , the Presidency faced the problem that some of its initiatives 
lacked specificity and "were much less distinct or impressive on closer examination ," 
according to Miles (2010 , p. 89). All in all, progress on Swedish Presidency ' s economy 
and employment priority can be described as moderate . The assessment of this priority 
is a 1. 
Environment and climate change. In addition to the economy , environmental 
and climate change issues were of top importance to the Swedish Presidency . The 2009 
United Nations Climate Change Conference took place toward the end of the 
Presidency period in Copenhagen , Denmark. This conference was the culmination of 
efforts during the Presidency preparation period and term to form a unified EU position 
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to present at the conference , and then form an international agreement on reducing 
emissions as well as financing to help developing countries reduce emissions and adapt 
to climate change . Another aspect of the priority involves economic instruments like a 
carbon tax or emissions trading scheme (Reinfeldt , 2009) . Miles (2010) notes that while 
the work program was careful not to include the complex issue of bringing the 
international scene together in agreement in Copenhagen , the Swedish government 
stressed high standards of success that would require agreement on major emissions 
reductions by international parties (p. 85). 
Miles (2010) explains that the Swedish Presidency managed to bring together 
general agreements but there were few specific measures to highlight. He does 
recognize that the Presidency met one of its principle objectives , "ensuring that the 
Union maintained internal EU co-ordination and common positions on many complex 
issues " (p. 89). Success , however , did not transfer over to international agreement at 
Copenhagen. No legally binding agreement was formed between countries and the 
Copenhagen conference was viewed negatively in terms of real outcomes . Sweden 
cannot be blamed for the failure of the international agreement , though . While the 
Swedish expectations of the conference were not met , the Presidency did succeed in 
some of its goals under the environmental priority . Langdal (2010 ) argues the 
Presidency "must be seen as having passed the test even though the desired results 
failed to materialize " because coordination was maintained within the EU, and a 
financing deal was put together in the European Council (p. 4 ). On the other hand , 
Brattberg et al. (2011 ) take a more pessimistic view that ' things did not unfold ... well ' 
for the Presidency in regard to environmental issues . They mostly fault the leadership of 
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the Presidency and point out that the EU ' s influence over negotiations was not strong at 
Copenhagen (p. 21 ). 
Sweden successfully coordinated an inclusive EU position ahead of 
Copenhagen , but at the conference the Union ' s representation was sidelined " lacking 
needed leadership , a combination of poor management of its international relations and 
an unconvincing internal climate /energy package ," according to a European 
Environmental Bureau official (Miles , 2010 , p. 90) . While the Presidency cannot be 
entirely blamed for the conclusions of Copenhagen , the Swedish environmental minister 
referred to the conference as "a disaster " in a European Voice artic1e (12/22/2009). All 
in all , the progress on the environment and climate change is evaluated as being 
moderate. The assessment of this priority is a 1. 
Justice and Home Affairs. The goal of the Swedish priority for Justice and 
Home Affairs was to develop a "more secure and open Europe " (Swedish Presidency of 
the European Union , 2009 , p. 7). In order to do so, the Presidency vowed to "develop 
cooperation across borders to protect democratic values and the rights of individuals , 
and to meet challenges facing Europe " (Swedish Presidency of the European Union , 
2009 , p. 3) . This included joint efforts to combat crime and form a better asylum and 
migration policy. The Stockholm Programme would be the body of work through which 
the priority would be developed . The focus of the Stockholm Programme was to specify 
cooperation from 2010 through 2014 in a variety of areas including pol ice, border 
control and customs , criminal and civil law, asylum , migration and visa policy (Swedish 
Presidency of the European Union , 2009 ; Reinfeldt , 2009) . 
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The adoption of the Stockholm Programme on December 11, 2009 was a 
success for the Swedish Presidency . Through the program , EU member states agreed 
they would attempt to complete a common asylum system by 2012 , something that was 
emphasized in the work program and of specific interest to Sweden because it had been 
one of the largest receivers of asylum-seekers in the EU (Miles , 2010 ; Langdal and von 
Sydow , 2009a) . Langdal and von Sydow (2009b) note that the Swedish Presidency has 
been at least partially successful in pursuing a "more liberal regimen in the area of 
asylwn and migration " (p. 11). On the other hand , Sweden received criticism from its 
citizens for not pursuing the protection of human rights as fully as desired (Langdal , 
2010). 
Overall , the achievements of the Swedish Presidency in terms of Justice and 
Home Affairs were considerable . The Stockholm Programme prompted cooperation on 
many of the topics designated in its work program . In post-Presidency evaluation , the 
Swedish government expressed that it felt it had fulfilled its ambitions for the Justice 
and Home Affairs priority . Evidence suggests that substantial progress was made. The 
assessment of this priority is a 2. 
Baltic Sea region. The Swedish Presidency identifies the Baltic Sea area as 
facing challenges including a cleaner marine environment and becoming a more 
competitive region . The area consists of nine countries - Sweden , Denmark , Estonia , 
Finland , Gennany , Latvia , Lithuania , Poland and Russia - of which eight are members 
of the EU . The Presidenc y hoped to address how to "transform the Baltic Sea region 
into a stronger engine for growth and development " (Swedish Presidency of the 
European Union , 2009 , p. 3). It envisioned progress would take shape by "strengthening 
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the internal market , investing in infrastructure , and implementing a regional strategy for 
research, development and innovation " (Reinfeldt , 2009 ). The plan would be the first 
EU strategy for a macro-regional area , and the Swedish anticipated that not only would 
it benefit the Baltic region , but it could also set a precedent for future macro-regional 
strategies . 
The adoption of the Baltic Sea Regional Strategy in October was a 'relatively 
uncontroversial process ," and met overall success (Langdal , 2010 , p. 5). Langdal and 
von Sydow (2009b) point to the strategy as an example of Sweden acting as a leader , an 
agenda-setter , and organizing broad support (p. 13). Miles critiques the strategy for not 
being specific enough , but praised it for being "relevant and relatively coherent " (2010 , 
p. 91) . 
The Presidency succeeded at meeting its goals of the Baltic Sea regional priority 
as it was laid out in the work program . It raised the attention of the EU to this region 
and provided the means for further cooperation through the Strategy . The assessment of 
this priority is a 2. 
EU's role as a global actor. Strengthening the EU ' s role as a global actor is the 
broadest and least detailed of the five Swedish Presidency priorities . The work program 
explains that the Presidency planned to work with "a clear agenda for peace , stability 
and development in [its] region and around the world " (Swedish Presidency of the 
European Union , 2009 , p. 9). EU enlargement falls under this category , a topic the 
Presidency views as " the most successful way to contribute to peace , democracy and 
prosperity in E urope " (Swedish Presidency of the European Union , 2009 , p. 3) . In terms 
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of enlargement , the Presidency planned to focus on Croatia and Turkey , but also 
strengthen the membership prospects of Western Balkan countries (Reinfeldt , 2009) . 
The Presidency ' s work regarding external relations was effective. Miles (20 10) 
explains, "T he work of the diplomatic corps of the Swedish Permanent Representative 
to the EU was regarded as ' exemplary '' (p . 91). Enlargement , in particular , was an area 
of success for the Presidency. Croatia entered its final phase of the accession process 
(Swedish Presidency of the European Union, 2009) , and although the Turkish process is 
slow, the environmental chapter in their accession negotiations was opened (Miles , 
2010). Additionally , a free trade agreement was secured with South Korea , which was 
another important success (Miles , 2010; Langdal , 2010). The Swedish Government 
points to 200 meetings held with non-EU countries as an example of its work on global 
action (Swedish Presidency of the European Union , 2010). 
Some areas of external relations were lacking , such as improving relations with 
Russia and the absence of progress at the Doha Round , for instance (La ngdal and von 
Sydow , 2009b). Overall progress was substantial , though. The assessment of this 
priority is a 2. 
While the global economic crisis remained a major factor in European politics 
during the Swedish Presidency term , the Presidency was fortunate because it did not 
face any major new international crises during its term . The setting was somewhat 
unusual , however , in that a new European Parliament was taking office , a new 
European Commission soon to be appointed and looming uncertainty about the future of 
the Lisbon Treaty (Reinfeldt , 2009) . The Presidenc y, according to Miles ' remained 
fundamentally pragmatic and result-oriented in practice " (20 I 0, p. 82) . A a whole , the 
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Swedish Presidency was successful. Unlike Slovenia and the Czech Republic , the 
Swedish Presidency had the benefit of prior Presidency experience and faced a more 
tranquil domestic political scene. The overall score for Sweden is an 8 out of 10. 
Scoring the three cases. In evaluation, I made sure to score each category and 
case independently of the others. The similar scores of the Swedish and Slovenian 
Presidencies seem to be in accord with assessments of these Presidencies in the 
literature - they were both fairly successful Presidencies. One must take into 
consideration the low expectations of the Slovenian Presidency, which may be related 
to their pragmatic work program and the fact that they were able to make at least 
moderate progress on many topics. Sweden was viewed as a stronger leader with 
Presidency experience, and more was expected of the country - but it still managed to 
perform well on most topics. It is also sensible that the Czech Presidency was ranked at 
a five , lower than the others, because although some progress was made , issues with 
leadership and the fall of the government marked the Presidency. 
Variables and Data 
In seeking to explain the relative success of each Presidency , I examine five 
independent variables against the cases ' scores in priority advancement to check for 
correlation. Four variables are Resources , Elections , EU Support and Experience, which 
are a11 considered important factors in explaining variation in Presidencies. To those , I 
add a fifth variable , which is a measure of the Presidency ' s ability to influence decision 
outcomes , drawing from Thomson ' s "Decision-making in the European Union " datasets 
and conclusions (Thomson , Stokman , Achen and Konig , 2006 ; Thomson et al. 20 I 2). 
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Resources allocated. Holding the Presidency is rewarding in many ways to 
countries but is also taxing , especially to small member states (Bukowski , 2009) . Sma ll 
states are said to have "inefficient resources " to carry out the Presidency or at least be 
disadvantaged by it (Tiilikainen , 2013, p. 107; Elgstrom , 2003). Resources used for the 
Presidency take many fonns , including staff , funding , and meeting space. The measure 
for this study is how much funding was allocated toward the Presidency . 
Hypothetically , the more resources a country puts toward its Presidency , the more 
personnel it can staff and it may function more effectively. 
This variable is measured in millions of euros allocated for Presidency 
operations. The data for resources was gathered from the work programs and other 
reports from Presidencies . The Czech Republic and Sweden reported their Presidency 
budgets in their local currency , so in order to compare the values they were converted to 
euros , using the rate from the final day of the Presidency period for consistency. The 
Slovenian Presidency budgeted 62 million euros, the Czech Republic 73.2 million ,9 and 
Sweden 94.8 million 10 (Slovenian Presidency Preparations website , n.d.; Czech 
Presidency Budget website , n.d.; Swedish Presidency of the European Union, 2010) . 
Upcoming elections. This variable measures how soon the next general 
elections are scheduled to take place . lf a government is concerned about upcoming 
elections , it may face difficulty in running a well-organized Presidency program . Up-
coming elections "put a mark on Presidency strategies by preventing policy initiatives 
that are expected to evoke negative popular bias" (Elgstrom , 2003 , p. 9). Presidencies 
9 l. 9 billion Czech koruna was equal to 73 .192 million euro s on June 30 , 200 9, accordin g to chart s 
from xe .com . 
10 971 million Swedish krona was equal to 94.796 million euro , accordin g to chart s from xe .com . 
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may be more cautious (Costa et al. , 2003), and less effective leaders. As explained 
earlier , Gennany is an example of how countries take upcoming elections , when it 
switched Presidency terms with Finland to avoid an election while holding the position. 
This variable is measured in the number of months from the end of the 
Presidency until the next scheduled general elections. Slovenia ' s Presidency ended on 
June 30, 2008, and their next elections were scheduled for September 2008 (3 months) 
(Bukowski, 2009; Fink-Hafner and Lajh, 2008) . The Czech Republic ' s Presidency term 
ended on June 30, 2009 and the next elections were scheduled for May 2010(11 
months) (Czech Statistical Office website). The next elections of the Swedish 
Presidency were scheduled ten months after the end of its Presidency term , in 
September 2010 (Miles, 2010). 
The proximity of elections to the conclusion of the Slovenian Presidency was a 
concern for the government (Bukowski, 2009). Most of the majority parties strategically 
agreed not to attack the government and even though the outcome of the agreement was 
mixed , it likely helped to make the Slovenian Presidency more stable and reduced the 
threat of elections to management during the Presidency tenn . 
Support for the EU. The range of support of the population and the governing 
administration toward European integration is a factor that can affect Presidency and 
trio performance (Batory and Puetter , 2013) . Related to integration is the support for 
EU membership . If a population does not feel that EU membership benefits their 
country , the people are not likely to be supportive of stronger EU policy . They may 
voice their opposition or attempt to impede measures of cooperation that the Presidency 
is working on. 
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The Eurobarometer is a semi-annual public opinion survey , published through 
the European Commission. One of the questions is, "Generally speaking , do you think 
(your country ' s) membership to the European Community is .. . ?" and the possible 
responses are that it is a good thing , a bad thing , neither good nor bad , or don ' t know. 
The percent of the country ' s population responding that the membership is a good thing 
is used as a measure of popular support for the EU . Responses from April 2008 are used 
for the Slovenian Presidency, June 2009 for the Czech Presidency and November 2009 
for the Swedish Presidency . 11 
Experience. Whether a country has experience holding the Presidency may 
affect its ability to manage the position efficiently and influence decision outcomes 
(Bunse , 2009 ; Szabo , 2011). Costa et al. (2003) points to the founding member states of 
the EU as holding the privilege of experience and "enjoy[ing] an unquestionable 
advantage " (p. 127). The number of times a state has held the Presidency can provide 
advantages , and the variable is measured as such. Sweden has held the Presidency once , 
while Slovenia and the Czech Republic have no Presidency experience. 
Thomson variable. The Thomson variable is derived from the dataset 
"Decision-making in the E uropean Union," compiled by Thomson, Stokman , Achen 
and Konig (2006), and updated in 2012 . Through extensive research and interviews the 
authors compiled a dataset containing infonnation on the positions and salience for each 
member state on 331 issues that fell under 125 different legislative proposals in the EU. 
They devised a Oto 100 scale , and plotted the positions of each member state , the 
European Parliament , the European Commission and the decision outcome for each 
11 These are date s of Eurob aro meter surveys . The data was pub I ished durin g eac h Pre sidency term 
and retr ieve d from Eurobarometer Interacti ve Search System 
(http ://ec .europa .eu/public _opinion/cf/index .cfm ?lang=en) . 
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issue designated as controversial. The group limited their research to controversial 
topics 12 because these have a wider range of positions and are more contentious in 
negotiation and finalization . Selecting controversial issues also gave the group an 
opportunity to test alternative theories (Thomson et aJ., 2006) . 
The variable is drawn from Thomson 's definition of a member state's influence: 
"the extent to which its actions result in decision outcomes that are congruent with its 
preferences " (2008a, p. 594). This is operationalized by measuring how close a 
finalizing Presidency ' s position is to the decision outcome. Using the updated 2012 
dataset, I categorized the data by which member state was holding the Presidency at the 
time of finalization of the legislation since Thomson (2008a), Warntjen (2008b) and 
others emphasize the finalizing Presidency as the one who bears the most influence over 
the outcome. Then , I pulled the data of the three Presidency cases- Slovenia, Czech 
Republic and Sweden. Data exists on the preferred position and outcomes of 15, 19 and 
3 decisions for Slovenia , the Czech Republic and Sweden , respectively. I compared the 
position of the state on each decision to the outcome. The distance between the two was 
recorded , and then averaged for each member state. The smaller the number , the closer 
the decision-outcome was to the Presidency ' s position on the issue, on average. The fact 
that there is information on only 3 Swedish decisions could potentially skew results , as I 
address along with other weaknesses of the study later. The updated dataset included 56 
post-2004 proposals , which included 155 issues . Unfortunately , Sweden 's 2009 
presidency took place at the end of the period covered by their research and therefore 
only a few issues were studied. 
12 In Thomson et al. ' s (2006) measure , the decision was deemed controversial throu gh expert opinion 
and if it had been mentioned in the Agence Europe news service . 
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Table 3.1 Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Slovenia Czech Sweden Mean Std. 
2008 Republic 2009 Deviation 
2009 
Elections 13 3 11 10 8 4.3589 
EU Support 14 0.52 0.42 0.57 0.503 0.076 
I - 0 0 Experience ) 1 0.333 0.577 
Resources 16 62 73.191 94.796 76.662 16.67] 
Thomson 17 ,...,6 1,...,,..., .) . .J.) 28.947 53.333 39.471 12.531 
Priority 7 5 8 6.667 1.528 
Advancement 18 
Analysis and Results 
The variable observed as the dependent is Priority Advancement- the total 
scores of each country, weighted in the case of the Czech Republic. The study attempts 
to find which of the five factors described above are correlated with Priority 
Advancement. Though the sample is too small to draw conclusive findings , a significant 
variable may be able to point future research in certain directions. 
Because of the small nwnber of cases and observations , many standard tests will 
not function properly with this data. Instead of count-based models, like the Chi Square 
test , the small state Presidency data must be examined under a rank-based model. While 
some of the relationships appear to have a clear relationship (see Appendix A for 
graphs), others do not. One cannot use Linear Regression because the data does not 
meet assumptions such as nonnally distributed residuals, nor are there enough counts. 
Part of these issues stems from the fact that the number of observations is so small . 
13 Number of months between end of Presidency and next scheduled general elections . 
14 Percent of the country ' s population who say EU membership benefits their country. 
15 Number of times has held Presidency before . 
16 Budget allocated to Presidency , in millions of EUR . 
17 Average distance between the Presidency 's position on an issue and the outcome , from Decision-
Making in the European Union II dataset , Thomson et al. (2012). 
18 How well the country advanced its priorities on a scale of 0-10, each priority being worth 2 
possible points , the Czech Republic weighted since it only had three priorities in its work program . 
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The best approach to examine this data is therefore to check for a relationship 
through correlation . The Pearson product moment correlation coefficient is not suitable 
because it requires interval or ratio level data , and many of the variable values are 
ordinal. Additionally , it measures linear relationships . Many of the graphs in the 
Appendix are non-linear , and without more robust data it is too difficult to tell what a 
fuller graph might look like. 
The Kendall ' s tau test is therefore a favorable alternative. According to Field 
(2000), Kendall ' s tau is helpful evaluating correlation in small datasets. This method 
was used to examine which factors might influence Priority Advancement in small state 
Presidencies . Because I am interested in what influences an increase in the Priority 
Advancement score, a one-tailed test is suitable . 
Table 3.2 - Kendall's tau correlation coefficient follows on the next page. 
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Results. With such a small amount of data , it is not surprising that only two 
variables are significant in relation to Priority Advancement. There are few cases and 
few observations. If this study were replicated over a larger set of cases , it is 
conceivable that clearer results would be established. Correlation between EU support 
and Priority Advancement may be discovered to still be significant. 
Both the EU Support and the Thomson variables were correlated with Priority 
Advancement , significant at the a = 0.01 level. The correlation coefficient was a 1, 
meaning that according to Kendall's tau b, the relationships between Thomson and EU 
Support against Priority Advancement are extremely strong. 
The possibility to extrapolate these results is clearly limited due to the small 
number of case studies . However, the results indicate that as EU support increases in a 
country ' s population, the small state Presidency is better able to advance priorities laid 
out in its work program. This conclusion is logical: if the populace is supportive of EU 
integration measures , it is less likely to challenge its government on such issues. When 
the population is supportive of the EU at large, as well as Presidency initiatives , the 
state can focus on EU diplomatic issues and is less torn between national and EU-level 
politics and duties . 
The correlation between the Thomson variable and Priority Advancement is 
especially interesting . The Thomson variable , once again , is the average distance 
between a finalizing Presidency country ' s position on controversial issues and the 
position of the decision outcome . A lower Thomson average indicates that decision 
outcomes were closer to a Presidency state ' s position and presumably its national 
interests. A higher Thomson number indicates that outcomes were , on average , farther 
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away from the Presidency state ' s own position. Before any conclusions are considered , 
it is important to note that the Thomson dataset only had data on 3 decisions carried out 
under the Swedish Presidency. This alone probably affected the Swedish average and 
therefore the explanatory capability of the Thomson variable in general. More robust 
data would provide a clearer picture . However , if one were trying to explain why the 
correlation between high Thomson averages and high Priority Advancement scores - or 
low averages and low scores- one might consider the difference of experience. As a 
first-time Presidency holder , the Czech Republic may have viewed the position as an 
opportunity to advance its national political interests and be less cautious about 
impartiality. Because the average decision outcome on controversial issues was farther 
away for Sweden, one might believe that with the experience of having operated the 
Presidency position in the past, Sweden was more sensitive to the neutrality norm . 
While the correlation between the Thomson average and experience is not significant at 
a = 0.1 (its significance is 0.11 ), it appears these factors may be correlated. Further 
research would be necessary , of course , in order to recognize a trend . 
Potential weaknesses. The small number of cases and therefore limited quantity 
of observations for each variable certainly affect the results of this study. While the 
study can suggest correlation between variables , a larger case study with fuller data 
would be necessary to indicate correlation with greater confidence . A study covering a 
larger range of Presidency cases could examine if support for EU integration is a 
significant factor in how well a Presidency advances its priorities . It would also be 
helpful to follow up and examine the relationship found between priority advancement 
and the Thomson variable , in order to determine if the link between successful priority 
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advancement and the further average distance from the country ' s policy position is 
significant when tested on a larger scale . The further distance potentially indicates 
adherence to the role of a neutral broker. The small amount of data from Thomson et al. 
(2012) on controversial issues during the Swedish Presjdency likely affected the 
analysis and comparison. The correlations presented jn this study should not be 
understood as actuality, but rather possible subjects of focus in future research . 
Conclusions 
The Kendall ' s tau test shows that EU Support and Thomson variables are highly 
correlated with the countries ' Priority Advancement scores. The Thomson average and 
Experience variables also appear to possibly be correlated , but they were not significant 
at the a = 0.1 level. These results cannot be extrapolated to small state EU Presidencies 
in general and are not conclusive due to the small number of cases. The results do 
indicate where one could expand future research , looking to the observed relationship 
between priority advancement and EU support in particular. It may also be important to 
consider testing other variables for correlation , such as the strength of a country ' s civil 
service , preparation and trio cooperation. 
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Conclusion 
The role of the Presidency and how the EU member states utilize it will continue 
to be an important subject of analysis for those studying European Union politics . Even 
with the changes in the Presidency position after the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009, the Council Presidency plays an important role in the decision-making 
process and gives each member state the opportunity to lead the Council of Ministers. 
While the permanent president chairs the European Council , the country in the rotating 
Presidency still has a coordinating role . The Presidency remains an important force in 
EU decision-making. The priorities of Presidencies provide a strong basis from which 
to judge their success in advancing goals over the six-month term. There will always be 
unexpected external factors that affect how the Presidency leads , but how a state 
handles these surprises demonstrates its flexibility and diplomatic skill. 
In the case studies presented , Sweden advanced its priorities with the most 
success. While the Presidency received criticism over environmental negotiation in the 
Copenhagen Conference , it performed well in terms of external relations and promoting 
the Baltic Sea region. Slovenia ranked second of the three countries . Its pragmatic 
planning , including sending officials to Brussels prior to the Presidency to gain 
knowledge of the EU bureaucracy and decision-making process , and others ' low 
expectations of its capability contributed to positive receptivity . The Czech Presidency 
performed the most poorly out of these three cases , according to the priority rankings . 
Considering the state ' s domestic political strife , the progress it did make is remarkable 
in some ways. The Czech Presidency was especially successful in promoting measures 
related to the economic priority in its work program . 
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Trio coordination , or lack thereof , is a factor that may have contributed the 
performance of these countries . Slovenia was in the first tri partnered with Germany 
and Portugal - and as the original group , these countries had no trio example to look to 
or base their planning on and one might expect that cooperation would not be extremely 
high. Udovic & Svetlicic (2012) found the Germany - Portugal - Slovenia trio to be 
important during the Presidency planning stages but insignificant during the operation 
of Slovenia's Presidency term. On the other hand , the France - Czech Republic -
Sweden trio did not experience continuity and "lacked real coordination and mutual 
support " (Fabry , 2009 , p. 29) . The trio countries seemed to favor individual strategies in 
preparation and action during the Presidency terms (Jensen & Nedergaard , 2014). As 
trio coordination continues , it may play a larger role in the success of Presidencies , but 
for early trio Presidencies it does not appear to have been as important as factors like 
the domestic political situation and EU support in shaping their presidency terms . 
In examining the correlation of Priority Advancement with five other factors, the 
Kendall ' s tau coefficient indicated that EU support and the Thomson variable are highly 
correlated with how well a Presidency advances its priorities . These results are not 
conclusive , but may provide a guide for future research . Another potential area for 
future study on the EU Council Presidency would be to create a measure of the level of 
domestic political stability , as this is another factor scholars indicate affects Presidency 
performance. Other areas to consider are the strength of a Presidency country s civil 
service . This could be measured in terms of experience or how the civil service is 
primarily formed , through merit- and test-based appointments or political appointees . 
The Presidency offers states an opportunity to lead but also is demanding in terms of 
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personnel and financial resources . The stronger and more knowledgeable a civil service 
is, the better the Presidency may perfonn . Strength of preparation and trio cooperation 
are other factors that would be important to cover. Lastly , selecting cases with a broader 
range of experience levels (whether measured as length of EU membership or number 
of times holding the Presidency ) may reveal a stronger correlation to priority 
advancement. 
Additionally , future research may examine the evolving relationship between the 
Commission and the Presidency. Because the Commission has the ability to deliver 
proposals , but the Council and its Presidency can request proposals , they have an 
important link. The Council Secretariat is a resource that can help facilitate closer work 
between the two . 
ln conclusion , my goal is that this paper contributes at least minimally to the 
study of and interest in the EU Council Presidency position , and particularly the role of 
small states . The Presidency plays an important role in EU decision-making through its 
leadership in the Council of Ministers and its work with the Commission and 
Parliament. While the position can be taxing , small state Presidencies can be very 
successful and well received . The Presidency position offers host countries the ability to 
guide EU decision-making and buffer their reputation and credibility . It plays an 
important part of the setup of the European Union. Based on Presidency literature , 
preparation , coordination with the General Secretariat and a stable domestic political 
scene (one without upcoming elections or an unstable coalition) are all factors that 
contribute to the relative success of a Presidency . This paper demonstrates that the level 
of EU support in the host country appears to be related to how well a country advances 
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its stated priorities, in the three cases examined here at least. This proposed relation 
should be examined further , and other factors such as civil service and use of the 
Council Secretariat would be beneficial to future research . 
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Appendix A - Graphs of the Variables 
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Figure I. Elections variable against Priority Advancement. 
EU Support 
.i 
;: !! + 
C ... 
V' • c =· r,. E 
r,. :, E • r: 
<( j >-.t c ·c: 
do 
~) 
C ~I u..: 0. 3 U 1 D.:i u t 
EU Suppor t !percen tage) 
Figure 2. EU Support variable against Priority Advancement. 
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Figure 3. Experience variable against Priority Advancement. 
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Figure 4. Resources variable against Priority Advancement. 
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